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1. INTRODUCTION
Morten Balling, Jan Marc Berk & Marc-Olivier Strauss-Kahn
On September 3-4, 2009 SUERF and Utrecht University School of Economics
jointly organized the 28th SUERF Colloquium The Quest for Stability in Utrecht,
the Netherlands. The papers included in this SUERF Study are based on contri-
butions to the Colloquium.
Chapter 2 “Macroprudential supervision: from concept to practice” by Henk J.
Brouwer, Executive Director, De Nederlandsche Bank, compares micro-pruden-
tial and macro-prudential supervision with supervision of an airplane. Each part
of an airplane must be monitored regularly but it is also crucial to monitor the
whole aircraft and its ability to fly which depends on the interaction of all parts.
Authorities with responsibility for respectively macro and micro issues should be
under one roof, as is the case in De Nederlandsche Bank. The responsibility for
financial stability should be anchored in legislation. A stronger legal backing is
needed both at EU level and the national level. The mutual understanding
between micro and macro experts needs to be strengthened.
Chapter 3 “How to bring in systemic risk considerations into financial regulation
and supervision?” is based on the contribution by Jukka Vesala, Deputy Director
General, Finnish Financial Supervision Authority. The author presents a review
of several regulatory options. He argues against proposals to limit the size of
individual institutions and to narrow the scope of bank activities per institution.
Narrow banking would imply loss of synergy and lead to a financial environment
in which non-banks develop even further and uncontrolled and unsupervised
risks spread even more. Public intervention should be neutral, with it being left to
the market forces to shape the structure and scope of the business activities of
individual firms. The core issue is to strengthen risk management in especially
systemic institutions in order to limit the probability of their failure. We should
refrain from introducing another capital adequacy yardstick than the present
Basel II risk-based minimum capital charge. Public authorities should not deter-
mine when a capital buffer should be built-up. The size of buffers should be based
on individual banks’ internal models and specific portfolio composition. Banks
could be required to have a capital buffer based on recessionary parameters. Data
requirements could be extended to cover past recession periods. In conclusion,
the author repeats that sources of systemic risk should be managed within the
present risk-based prudential regulation and supervision framework.
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Chapter 4, “The Quest for Financial Stability in Europe” is by Dirk Schoen-
maker,  Dean, Duisenberg School of Finance, Amsterdam. According to the
author, an important lesson to be learnt from the 2007-2009 financial crisis has
been that coordination among European countries is wanting. Present crisis
arrangements are primarily national based. Coordination works when the inter-
ests of the national governments are aligned. If national interests diverge, coordi-
nation breaks down. There is a need to put crisis management at a European
footing. In addition, there is a need to upgrade macro-prudential supervision in
the European Union. In tables, the author presents what he calls a toolkit for
financial supervision and stability and an overview of the current division of pow-
ers between national and European authorities. Inspired by the de Larosière
Report, the author explores the implications of stronger European cooperation
concerning financial supervision.
Chapter 5, “Assistance to Financial Institutions in Distress: Implications for Cen-
tral Banks” is written by Nicola Brink and Michael Kock from the South African
Reserve Bank. The authors compare the interventions by the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, Bank of England and European Central Bank and the implications of these
interventions for the central banks themselves. In the period from August 2008
until December 2008, the balance sheets of the central banks more than doubled
in total. The paper explains to what extent special loan facilities contributed to
the growth and structural changes of the balance sheets in the three central banks.
The Fed has emerged as being the most aggressive of the three central banks and
has accepted large risk exposures related to uncollateralised loans and corporate
securities.
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2. MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION: 
FROM CONCEPT TO PRACTICE
Henk J. Brouwer
I’m of course delighted to be here at this 28th SUERF Colloquium. The interaction
between academics and practitioners is now more important than ever. As the
darkest clouds over the economy seem to be lifting, and the first sunbeams are
breaking through, we have to make important decisions about the future design
of the financial landscape. There are many questions and uncertainties about the
specific characteristics of the new financial system. Not in the least because of the
massive public interventions that have taken place. However, we all agree about
one thing. The new financial system has to become more stable. Hence, this col-
loquium on ‘The quest for stability’ could not be more topical.
As an executive board member of the Dutch central bank, I have covered the
central banking part of the institution for many years, before taking up responsi-
bility for banking supervision at the start of this year. Hence, I should be in a good
position to reflect today on the interface between these two areas. The place
where macro and micro come together. That is, the so-called macroprudential
approach. A rather new and difficult term, which even my up-to-date Microsoft
spell checker still does not recognize. So in order to avoid confusion, I will first
clarify this concept a bit more, before going into its practical implications.
2.1. WHAT IS THE MACROPRUDENTIAL APPROACH
The word ‘macroprudential’ is today on everyone’s lips. Yet, the concept remains
somewhat ambiguous. What do we mean when we say that we need a macropru-
dential approach? What is the difference with microprudential supervision? And
what are the benefits of macroprudential supervision and regulation? Although it
is easy to extend this list of questions, it is not always easy to answer them.
First, I have to point out that, although the current financial crisis has illustrated
the importance of macroprudential supervision, the concept itself dates back to
much earlier. The Bank for International Settlements used the term already in the
late 1970s. It realized that focusing supervision exclusively on individual institu-
tions is not sufficient to ensure financial stability. However, it was just since the
start of this century that efforts were made by Andrew Crockett and Claudio
Borio (BIS) to define the concept more precisely. Basically, they described the con-
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cept by comparing micro and macro prudential supervision. I will do the same
here.
Microprudential supervision tries to limit the distress of individual institutions.
Think about supervision of banks like Rabobank or ING. In this case, the ulti-
mate objective is to safeguard the stability of the institution and the interests of
investors and depositors. Macroprudential supervision on the other hand aims to
limit the risk to the financial system. So instead of looking just at Rabobank, ING
or any other individual institution in isolation, we look at the system as a whole.
The ultimate objective of this approach is to limit the probability and severity of
financial crises, mainly in terms of costs to GDP.
It is useful to illustrate this with an example. Compare the financial system with
a complex machine. For instance an aeroplane. Although a plane is much easier
to navigate than our financial system, this analogy will fit my purpose. Since the
safety of a plane is essential, each individual part, like the engine or wing, is
monitored on a regular basis. Besides this, the parts of a plane need to satisfy
strict quality requirements. Note that the main concern here is the functioning of
the individual components. This is the microprudential dimension. Now, forget
about the individual parts and try to take a macroprudential perspective. Since
our ultimate objective is to prevent a crash, we need a broader view than just
focusing on the individual elements. We want to assure that there are no vulner-
abilities in the technical infrastructure of the plane. We want to give special atten-
tion to very crucial, systemically relevant parts that have little back-up and could
by themselves cause a crash. And we definitely want to analyze in detail and high
frequency the weather conditions. Thus, a macroprudential approach asks for a
broader, more system-oriented perspective.
2.2. EMERGENCE OF MACROPRUDENTIAL PERSPECTIVE 
IN SUPERVISION
Now that we have some idea of what the macroprudential approach actually is,
it is not difficult to imagine why it has been in the lime light for some time, and
why, with this crisis, it is back on centre stage. Basically, a few forceful trends
have amplified the move towards a macroprudential approach. First we have wit-
nessed a wave of financial liberalization and globalization since the 1980s. Boom-
ing international trade has been accompanied by a rapid increase in cross-border
financing. Financial institutions responded to these developments by spreading
their wings and transforming themselves into global players. At the same time,
with the benefit of new computer technologies, financial institutions drove many
new innovations. More recently, this process of financial integration and innova-
tion experienced a huge acceleration. The wide-spread use of collateralized debt
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products and credit default swaps are just two examples of this. Over the years,
these structural changes increased the efficiency of international capital flows,
and of financial markets more generally. However, they also contributed to peri-
ods of market turbulence, asset bubbles and financial crises. The financial system
has become far more complex. It is like we have exchanged a manageable one-
propeller plane for a large high-speed jumbo jet – or perhaps even a stealth fighter,
hard to detect on the radar.
A second trend has to due with the size and complexity of financial institutions.
A number of institutions have become so important that they can be considered
as systemically relevant. Not only due to their large balance sheets but also since
they may dominate a particular market or are deeply embedded in the financial
system. Ex post, an example to illustrate this is the demise of Lehman Brothers.
This bank was so important to the financial system that its failure caused a finan-
cial earthquake. Its role in the global financial system was like the control stick,
or one of the wings of the airplane. When troubles arise in these crucial parts it is
extremely difficult to prevent a crash. Thus, the emergence of a larger, more inte-
grated and complex financial system as well as the emergence of larger and more
interconnected financial institutions need a macroprudential approach to miti-
gate systemic risks.
Finally, the focus on the macroprudential approach can be explained by the sub-
stantial economic costs of financial crises. Since the financial system has become
more interconnected and complex, the impact of a crisis has increased dramati-
cally. I think it is not necessary to elaborate on this since we all see and feel the
impact of the crisis we are in today.
Without a doubt, in the run-up to the crisis, the macroprudential approach was
certainly in the picture and early warnings were given by financial stability insti-
tutions, including my own central bank. But clearly, an adequate and effective
macroprudential framework has been lacking.
2.3. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The dramatic impact of this crisis has brought the discussion on macroprudential
oversight back to the fore. Although we are still investigating the black box, most
experts agree about one thing: the macroprudential approach to supervision
should become more important and better anchored. The challenge now is to put
these ideas into practice. So, for the remaining part of my speech, let me elaborate
on the practical implications of a macroprudential approach.
We can distinguish two broad categories when we practice macroprudential
supervision. That is, rules and discretionary policies. The rule-based approach
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can be built through automatic stabilizers that aim to limit system-wide risks, ex-
ante. The construction of countercyclical capital buffers by the Basel Committee
is an example of this. However, the difficulty to assess cycles makes it dangerous
to rely purely on automatic mechanisms, that cannot be precisely calibrated. An
autopilot for our financial system is certainly useful, but we also want to be able
to adjust the course manually. Therefore, we need discretionary judgement and
intervention. Yet, several issues have to be addressed to implement a proper dis-
cretionary macroprudential approach. I will focus on the institutional setting, the
macroprudential monitoring and follow-up, and the role of financial stability in
legislation.
2.4. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
First, the institutional setting. What is the best institutional architecture for a
macroprudential approach? Should we have a separate central bank and pruden-
tial supervisor? Or should we merge the two as we have done in the Netherlands?
This question has been subject to heated debate for years now. But the crisis has
shed new light on the answer. We have learned again that macroeconomic and
financial imbalances can closely interact. So it is of great importance that we
incorporate the macroeconomic dimension in our prudential framework. Since
central banks have an analytical advantage in judging the business cycle, moni-
toring financial markets and the payment system, it makes sense to give them a
pivotal role in assessing financial stability. Moreover, we should ensure intensive
interaction between macro- and microprudential supervision. In my view, the first
and most logical step is to bring both disciplines close together, ideally under one
roof. Just the simple fact that colleagues in both fields can easily grab a cup of
coffee together can make a difference. I think DNB already has taken some
important steps in this direction. In 2004 we merged with the Pension and Insur-
ance Supervisory authority. This brought prudential supervision of all relevant
financial players within one organization. From then on we not only supervised
individual institutions, but also focused on cross-sectoral risks. To make the most
of this new set up, we simultaneously established a financial stability division.
2.5. MONITORING
The main objective of this division is to play a coordinating role in preserving
financial stability. For that reason, we have to map risks in our financial system
continuously. An important instrument in monitoring the financial system is
macro stress testing. The forward-looking nature of this tool gives supervisors
and institutions insight into broader vulnerabilities and the impact of shocks.
From the macroprudential perspective, stress tests disclose possible behaviour
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responses of firms that are often at the heart of systemic risk. At DNB, we con-
duct these macro stress-tests on a regular basis. In my view this tool is an indis-
pensable part of the overall macroprudential framework.
Macroprudential analysis often finds it way in financial stability reports, in
DNB’s case called the financial stability overview. This semi-annual report anal-
yses the condition of the Dutch financial sector and is used internally by micro-
prudential supervisors. We also publish a shorter version with more aggregate
information for the general public. Financial stability reports are an important
macroprudential tool in the sense that they increase the awareness of vulnerabil-
ities in the financial system.
However, I think that they have more potential and should be enhanced. By say-
ing this, I do not refer to the analysis as such, but I am talking in particular about
the follow-up. Some financial stability reports that were published before the cri-
sis were shockingly accurate. Take for example our own financial stability report
of March 2007. This edition contains a stress scenario that assumes a complete
dry up of interbank funding. In the earlier overviews, we had pointed at the rapid
increase of leverage, the vulnerabilities of the credit risk transfer model, and the
risks of a sudden and sharp adjustment. These warnings were not exclusively
given by DNB. Other central banks, the ECB included, and the IMF signalled the
same risks in their financial stability reports. We have to acknowledge that,
although there were signs that imbalances were building up, no, or only limited
concrete policy actions were taken. It is like signalling dangerous thunderstorms
on the flight route but not altering course. If we want to make the macropruden-
tial approach work, we have to find a strategy for mitigating the risks that we
identify.
2.6. TRANSLATING WARNINGS INTO POLICY
Hence, the discretionary approach to macroprudential supervision requires a
translation of judgements into concrete risk mitigating policies. There are several
difficulties in doing this.
For instance, it is difficult to signal the building up of imbalances on a timely
basis, also because we need to have some comfort about observed weaknesses and
about the probability of related risks materializing. In an international context,
efforts are currently being made by the IMF and the FSB to develop a quantitative
method to monitor systemic risks continuously. These so-called early warning
exercises have risen to the top of the policy agenda. However, even when we are
certain about specific vulnerabilities, it is hard to convince private or, for that
matter, public agents of the need to alter their behaviour. It is not easy to take
away the punch bowl at a party, especially when the party is just starting. The
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IMF has extensive experience with policy recommendations that are not lived up
to. Related to this, how transparent can we be regarding imbalances and risks
without creating a self-fulfilling prophecy? In other words, how do you commu-
nicate about risks when the environment is already vulnerable without precipitat-
ing the crisis?
So although we have definitely made progress in developing our macroprudential
monitoring framework, we need to think seriously about how we should use it.
In this regard, continuing development of macroprudential policy instruments is
crucial. I think the use of discretionary adjustments to capital ratios, provisions
and margin requirements are a good starting point. However, in contrast to mon-
etary policy that clearly has its own instrument; it is difficult to identify a distinct
effective set of discretionary macroprudential tools. In fact, I think the search for
effective macroprudential instruments is one of the greatest challenges for central
bankers and supervisors in the near future.
In the meantime, we should continue to make efforts to ensure that the expertise
of macro and microprudential supervisors comes together. It is important that
this interaction takes place on the basis of mutual trust, confidentiality and
understanding. This is why at DNB we have internal financial stability reports
that give concrete guidance and policy recommendations. We enhanced the proc-
ess of horizontal interactions within the organisation by working with multidis-
ciplinary teams that bring micro and macro expertise together around specific
themes or cases. In the European context as well, steps have been taken to
enhance the macroprudential approach.
2.7. FINANCIAL STABILITY IN LEGISLATION
Finally, I want to say a few words on anchoring financial stability in legislation.
It is evident that the financial system has become far more complex than it used
to be several decades ago. Many new players have arrived and financial institu-
tions have become increasingly interconnected. Central bankers have a difficult
task in guarding the stability of this complex financial system. The ongoing crisis
stresses the need to improve our macroprudential instruments. In the same vein,
we should create the necessary legal basis to allow a successful implementation of
this macroprudential approach. If we want to be able to act quickly in case of
stress, we need a legal backing. This is something that is currently being evaluated
at European level by the commission. But also within our national boundaries,
financial stability should get a firmer anchor. Most relevant laws, like the ‘central
banking law’ in this country, offer sufficient room during normal times. However,
they give little ability to intervene in case of an emergency. We do not want to pass
through a thunderstorm for the reason that we cannot change course since we
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then would cross forbidden territory. And we do not want a public organisation
to violate the law either. If we take the macroprudential approach seriously,
authorities should give priority to this issue. Right now we have the momentum
to address difficult questions like shareholders’ rights, insolvency laws, manda-
tory information sharing by non-regulated entities, and so on. This is one impor-
tant step we have to take in our quest for stability.
2.8. CONCLUSION
Let me summarize the status of our flight today. There is common agreement of
the need for an enhanced macroprudential approach for supervision. However,
putting this noble ambition into practice is not easy. Several issues have to be
addressed to make the concept workable. We need to strengthen the mutual
understanding between micro and macroprudential supervisors. In addition we
have to ensure that signalled risks are followed up by concrete policy actions. One
way to realize this is by revising the instrumental and organisational setup, both
on a national basis and globally. Another key priority for authorities today is to
ensure that the financial stability mandate is better embedded in the relevant leg-
islation. Although there are many other issues that have to be addressed, these are
a good starting point. Of course, we should not have the illusion that with these
changes we can prevent any future crisis. But we would already have accom-
plished a lot if such unfortunate event results in a smooth landing.
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3. HOW TO BRING IN SYSTEMIC RISK 




It has long been recognised that there are dangers in the almost exclusive focus of
the micro-prudential regulation and supervision on the stability of individual
institutions, failing to pay attention to the stability of the financial system as a
whole (e.g. Borio and Lowe 2002, and Crockett 2000). However, rather little was
done to change the approach prior to the present financial crisis. There are excel-
lent and comprehensive analyses of the regulatory and supervisory failures lead-
ing to the present crisis e.g. in the de Larosière (2009) and Turner (2009) reports,
and in the documents developed in the G20 process. It has now become clear that
the systemic stability aspects were not well understood, which contributed to the
severity of the present crisis, and that the pro-cyclical linkages between the finan-
cial sector and the overall economic performance are stronger than anticipated.
Consequently, the debate on the correct regulatory response has been centred on
the question on how to reduce systemic risks to avoid another crisis of this mag-
nitude. Frustration with the present framework has led many academics and pol-
icy-makers to propose an intrusive approach to deal with the issue, which could
be labelled as “elimination of systemic risks”. This approach includes: proposals
to restrict the business activities allowed to regulated institutions (including ‘nar-
row banking’ proposals or even nationalizations of retail banks); higher capital
ratios and leverage caps for systemic institutions; focusing supervision solely on
legal units rather than financial groups; departing from international home-host
principles and treating subsidiaries and branches as independent institutions; and
cutting interbank and OTC derivatives market links between financial institu-
tions.
In this presentation, I will argue against this approach and favour an alternative
much less intrusive approach to “manage systemic aspects” via targeted measures
within the current risk-based prudential framework. While not attempting to be
comprehensive, I will also try to offer some concrete proposals to deal with the
systemic risk aspects. I will organise my remarks in three categories: 1) Mitigating
the financial stability concerns linked to the contagion of problems from one indi-
1 The views and errors are my own responsibility.
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vidual (systemic) financial institution; 2) Limiting the pro-cyclicality of financial
regulation; 3) Enhancing the cooperation and coordination between micro- and
macro-prudential authorities.
Underlying my analysis is the definition of financial stability adopted by Padoa-
Schioppa (2004) as … “a condition in which the financial system is able to with-
stand shocks without giving way to cumulative processes that impair the alloca-
tion of savings to investment opportunities and the processing of payments in the
economy”. This definition focuses on the implications for the real economy as the
key concern for public intervention in the financial sector. It also represents a
broad definition of financial stability including the contagion of idiosyncratic
problems across the financial system and the spreading of common problems of
several financial institutions simultaneously. While the present crisis clearly
started from idiosyncratic problems (i.e. the huge losses from US sub-prime
related securities of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers and few other major insti-
tutions) and contagion through financial markets due to lack of liquidity, it has
since then turned into a situation where the weakened condition of the whole
financial sector and pro-cyclicality have triggered a major global recession.
3.2. LIMITING THE RISK OF FAILURES OF INSTITUTIONS 
THAT COULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO FAIL
3.2.1. Limits to size and/or business activities
As one solution to eliminate the systemic risks stemming from individual failures
and to limit the moral hazard consequences of the public rescues of systemic insti-
tutions, limits to the size of single institutions have been proposed by e.g. Buiter
(2009) and also Governor King. Size of institutions (that are ‘too-big-to-fail’) is
considered to be the relevant aspect here. A complex or international business is
not seen as a threat to systemic stability when business volumes are small.
A related and rather widely advocated proposal to deal with systemic risks and
moral hazard has been ‘narrow’ or ‘public utility banking’. Underlying this idea
is also a lack of trust in the ability of regulation or supervision to adequately
contain the risks of financial institutions.
In this approach, banks would just hold retail deposits on the liability side and
reserves and very low risk or secured debt instruments on the asset side. Only
‘narrow banks’ would be entitled to take care of retail deposit and payment activ-
ities; and one could limit the public safety net (deposit insurance and lending-of-
last-resort) to ‘narrow banks’ only. These institutions would not be allowed to
engage in other financial activities, or have other sources of funding, thus limiting
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the size of the banks and eliminating the possibility of excessive risk-taking (i.e.
moral hazard). While ‘narrow banks’ would be closely supervised, the remainder
of banking and financial activity would be completely free of regulation and
supervision; but also excluded from the safety net.
The ‘narrow banking’ proposals are rather old and made by Merton and Bodie
(1993), and even already much earlier by Tobin and Friedman when considering
the virtues of ‘100% reserve banking’. There are three main reasons why I would
think that the ‘narrow banking’ model would be clearly inferior to the present
framework of not restricting the business activities of universal banks.
First, the model would be highly inefficient as it would break-up the synergies
between the credit granting and deposit taking-functions of banks. For instance,
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (1999) demonstrate that deposit-taking and providing
credit lines can be regarded as manifestations of the same liquidity provision
function, there are synergies between the two, and the need for liquid reserves and
other resources would be much greater if the two services were produced sepa-
rately.
Second, and most importantly, it will not be credible to leave major institutions
providing credit to firms and households out of the scope of the public interest in
the financial system. Following the definition of financial stability linking it with
the performance of the real economy, it is not only the wealth of depositors which
needs to be protected, but also the provision of credit to the economy.
Hence, the scope of regulation and supervision should be broad rather than nar-
row. Adoption of the ‘narrow bank’ model would probably lead to a financial
environment in which non-bank banks develop even further and uncontrolled
and unsupervised risks spread even more. The crisis has demonstrated that also
other than banks can be sources of systemic instability and, hence, potential sub-
jects of ‘bank-like’ regulation and supervision. For example, failures of invest-
ment banks, SIVs and hedge funds can be sources of contagion to the banking
sector. Nevertheless, the banking system might still be the main link between the
financial and real sectors of the economy through the credit and payment system
channels.
Finally, the ‘narrow banking’ model might not even guarantee the stability of the
restricted banks. By artificially restricting the margins earned by banks, one could
actually increase the incentives to gamble in order to earn higher return on share-
holder investment. Hence, a ‘narrow banking’ model would need to be coupled
with ultra strict supervision of compliance with the investment restrictions.
The general reason for my negative stance to size and business restrictions is that,
ideally, any public intervention should be neutral, leaving it to the market forces
to shape the structure and scope of the business activities of individual firms.
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Non-neutral regulation would always also cause competitive distortions, major
inefficiencies and limit beneficial innovations. Moreover, the way in which finan-
cial activity can be structured makes it easy for financial institutions to circum-
vent any business limitations.
It is clear that before the crisis financial innovations went too far from investor
transparency and risk management perspectives, for instance, but the underlying
reason for banks’ risk-taking in these instruments could actually be non-neutral
regulation. Achraya (2009) attributes the expansion in the sub-prime related risks
of major banks to circumvention of capital regulations rather than anything else.
The two main channels of taking sub-prime exposures were: off-balance-sheet
exposures via SIVs guaranteed by parent banks, and large super-senior tranches
on banks’ trading books, which were both treated much less stringently in the
capital regulation than regular on-balance-sheet exposures. Hence, there was
strong incentive to take on these risks as the returns on capital were high.
A specific problem is caused by “too-big-to-save” banks (as the Icelandic banking
crisis demonstrates), which does not quite fit into the above analysis and where
size restrictions might be even justified. Notably, the possibilities and incentives
of national authorities to control the risk-taking of such relatively very large
banks could be limited.
3.2.2. Strengthening risk management in systemic 
institutions
Rather than ‘eliminating’ systemic risks through intrusive regulations we should
strive to ‘manage’ them within the current risk-based prudential framework. The
core issue is to strengthen risk management in especially systemic institutions in
order to limit the probability of their failure.
Risk management standards should be graduated to be more demanding for sys-
temic institutions, reflecting the size and complexity of their activities and the
externalities of their possible failures. After the outburst of the crisis, we saw that
there were major shortcomings in the internal control and risk management func-
tions in even the largest and most sophisticated financial institutions.
The origin of the present problems was the exposure to sub-prime securities.
What we have, essentially, is one business area taking such a large concentrated
risk position that can take down even some of the largest and complex banking
organizations, active in dozens of business lines and countries. These institutions
did not sell away or hedge these positions (especially in the super-senior tranches),
as models told them the positions to be safe to hold and could be priced at a very
low risk premium. With the benefit of hindsight, these risks were hugely mis-
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priced and mismanaged. There was no central oversight (and maybe even under-
standing) of the major risk positions taken as there was largely management by
profit objectives at the expense of effective centralized risk management. The sen-
ior management has to be aware of the firm-wide risks, risk-taking has to be in
line with the overall policy of the organization, and risk management has to be
strong enough to put in place the necessary controls upon the business units.
We need to have a framework that supports incentives for sound risk manage-
ment. Supervisory authorities cannot perform this function and the main respon-
sibility must lie with the banks themselves to implement sound internal govern-
ance and risk management. However, regulation and supervision also need to
play an important role. Managers and traders are given implicit or contractual
incentives by share-holders to take on risks. But it can be seen based on the
finance literature that the incentives can be ‘wrong’ due to principal-agent prob-
lems and failure to internalise the costs of financial distress and systemic risks (see
e.g. the seminal analysis by Dewatripont and Tirole 1993).
There has been a lot of attention in the literature to effective market discipline in
providing the incentives for sound risk-taking and management. However, the
present crisis has demonstrated major failures in the ability of market discipline
to constrain institutions’ behavior (see e.g. Gropp and Vesala 2003 and 2004 for
discussion on the possibilities and limits of market discipline). The incentives of
creditors and share-holders to influence management could be thwarted by the
fact that systemic institutions would always remain in the public interest to be
rescued without losses to non-insured creditors and even share-holders. Incen-
tives to influence can also be reduced by the difficulty of reaching private sector
solutions in case of major institutions (Mayes et. al. 2009). Hence, one would
need to generate much stronger incentives to creditors and share-holders by
restricting the public sector safety-net and setting out pre-agreed rules to deal
with failing institutions, but even this might be regarded as time-inconsistent pol-
icy. Therefore, the role of official regulation and supervision is central in support-
ing sound risk management in systemic institutions, while market discipline
should assume a complementary role.
More precisely, regulations would need to set out strong-enough standards for
risk management, like independent and strong-enough status in the organization;
and for corporate governance, such as requiring remuneration policies which do
not encourage taking huge short-term bets. The observance of the principles in
the actual activities of the institutions will need to be closely supervised, which
puts high demands on supervisors’ resources, and supervisors should spend more
resources and set higher standards regarding the actual implementation of the
principles in systemic institutions.
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3.2.3. Changes to prudential requirements for systemic 
institutions
First of all, it is clear that the present prudential framework is not neutral. Basel
II favours large size through lower capital charges for more sophisticated and
bigger banks that can adopt more advanced internal modeling approaches. This
is justified by creating incentives to develop more sophisticated risk management
tools. As noted, Basel II also treated certain risks more favourably than the risks
on the regular balance sheet. These two-types of shortcomings will have to be
corrected in order not to actually lower the risk absorbing capacity of the large
systemic institutions. There are already decisions aimed at fixing the second type
of problems, while unfortunately not yet to eliminate the benefits of size.
Some observers have advocated higher capital charges for systemic banks, but
this would go against the neutrality principle and cause new types of distortions.
I would rather graduate the risk management principles and the intensity of
supervision to be greater for systemic institutions, as I already noted.
Second, we will have to be much more critical towards the use of models and the
assumptions on which the models are built. The present crisis has demonstrated
many shortcomings: There has been too much reliance on historical data and the
assumptions of neutrality and continued availability of market liquidity; and cor-
relations between risks has been hugely underestimated, for instance. One aspect
of systemic risks which needs to be recognized is that correlations tend to increase
at times of stress and risk and capital allocation models will need to take this into
account. Supervisors need to take a conservative stance, in my view, towards
allowing for diversification benefits as these tend to disappear at times of stress
when capital actually needs to be available to absorb losses.
Models will continue to be central for modern risk management and we should
not reverse the developments put in place in Basel II extending the use of models
also to the calculation of the minimum capital requirements. The key lesson is
that the models cannot be left to dominate judgment – like seems to have hap-
pened – and firms will have to develop stress testing practices to identify the sever-
ity of the risks outside the scope of the models, or which are deemed by the mod-
els to be highly improbable.
Third, the internal controls and limit policies of the firms themselves must be
substantially strengthened to avoid single business lines (or even single persons)
from taking life-threatening risk positions, even how improbable the risks might
seem. The problems experienced now are not new – single risk positions have
taken down relatively big banks even before – remember Barings; and similar
modelling failures resulted in the near-collapse of LTCM.
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Supervisors should as a matter of priority see to that such concentration risks are
addressed by means of adequate stress tests (so-called reverse stress tests). While
institutions need to hold capital against concentration risks (in their Pillar 2 cap-
ital allocation), I think the extreme risk concentrations are not a capital allocation
issue, but that institutions should refrain from taking-up altogether risk positions
that would lead to the failure of the entire institution in any adverse situation.
In addition, supervisors should effectively enforce the Basel II/Pillar 2 require-
ment for banks to identify and manage all material risks at the group level irre-
spective of the structure of legal entities and to cover the risks with adequate
capital buffers. In this context, supervisors’ powers to require limits to risk posi-
tions and ask for higher capital buffers might need to be clarified and strength-
ened. At the moment, these powers can be in EU countries too vaguely stated, or
allowed to be used only too late to be effectively used by supervisors (CEBS
2009a).
Finally, it is important for banks and supervisors to consider the concentration
risks related to the specific business model employed. The obvious lesson from
the cases of Northern Rock and Icelandic banks has been that the business models
based on financing rapid growth by strong reliance of market-based funding can
result in a major vulnerability. In response to these events, supervisors globally
and in the EU have rapidly drafted new guidance and regulation of liquidity and
funding risks. For instance, introduction of a core funding ratio is being consid-
ered as a new supervisory yardstick.
3.2.4. Managing interconnectedness between institutions
Strict limits on interbank exposures and exposures between parent and subsidiary
institutions, effectively banning OTC derivatives by asking them to be moved on
exchanges, and requiring always real time gross settlement of payment obliga-
tions rather than allowing net settlement, represent proposals to ‘eliminate’ sys-
temic risks stemming from the contagion of individual firm failures. Also here I
would support the ‘risk management’ approach to deal with the systemic risks for
the same principle reasons of enforcement difficulties and high efficiency costs
caused by intrusive regulations I already discussed. Inter-institution exposures
should be dealt with as one aspect of managing concentration risks, and, without
going into details, interbank markets and OTC derivatives markets could be
made more transparent and resilient by moving towards clearing house-solutions.
Banning intra-group exposures, or requiring subsidiaries to fulfil all prudential
requirements in the same way as individual institutions, would effectively cancel
the efficiency benefits of centralised funding and risk management. Effective con-
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solidated supervision and co-operation across different authorities should be
relied upon instead.
Finally, co-operation in colleges of supervisors should be further developed to
exchange information and to plan and execute supervisory duties such that all
supervisors could be comfortable with the level of supervision. Safeguards in reg-
ulation are, however, needed for instance for the host supervisors of systemic
branches of foreign institutions to guarantee access to relevant information and
supervisory decision-making. Recent changes adopted in EU legislation move to
the right direction, while the actual supervisory co-operation practices will need
to be stepped up.
3.3. ADDRESSING THE PRO-CYCLICALITY PROBLEM
There is quite a lot of consensus on the need to remove or at least reduce the
impact of the pro-cyclical elements of financial regulation (Basel II, IFRS rules
etc.) on real economic performance. The objective is clear: “to have a mechanism
that allows the buffer of capital above the regulatory minimum to be built-up
during an economic boom and strong earnings growth so that the buffer would
be available to absorb higher losses in stressful environments” (Financial Stability
Forum 2009). There are, however, quite diverging views on how the objective
should be accomplished in practice.
I think we should focus on having a buffer that is able to deal with the business
cycle fluctuations. Having a buffer aimed at covering also losses from extreme
adverse events or worst case scenarios could result in unrealistically high or inef-
ficient capital charges (e.g. Rajan 2008 presents the drawbacks of too high capital
requirements). These risks should rather be covered by internal limits on risk
concentrations, as I already noted. Rajan (2008) also makes interesting sugges-
tions about how private capital insurance could be used to draw on extra capital
when needed (replacing the need for an ex ante buffer), but I will not be dwelling
on such proposals. I will concentrate on how the size of the capital buffer (i.e. the
target level of capital above the minimum charge) should be determined and how
the buffer could be depleted when needed.
3.3.1. Determining the size of the buffer above minimum 
capital requirements
A principal choice is between non-discretionary, rules-based and discretionary
mechanisms (leaving the size of the buffer to banks’ and supervisors’ judgment).
There are clear arguments in favour of a transparent rules-based calculation of
the size of the adequate capital buffer. Most importantly, investors might not
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allow the depletion of the buffer if it is not clearly set out in advance that banks
will build-up a buffer above the minimum capital requirement in an expansion
and will run it down in a recession.
As a starting point, I think we should strongly refrain from introducing another
capital adequacy yardstick than the Basel II risk-based minimum capital charge.
The original justifications for risk-based capital charges underlying the Basel II
reform are still very valid (see e.g. Gordy and Howells 2006). Only a risk-based
measure avoids the incentives to risk-arbitrage and to take on risks that are high,
but which would be allocated too a low capital charge in a non-risk based system.
At least there is no strong evidence yet accrued by supervisors that – while diffi-
cult and resource-consuming for both banks and supervisors – Basel II charges
could not be reliably implemented by banks. Moreover, Basel II measures have
favourable information content compared to non-risk based capital ratios.
Hence, also when determining the target buffer to be used to absorb economic
fluctuations we should use a measure that draws on the internal models and the
actual detailed portfolio composition of individual banks. Using any other meas-
ure for the target buffer size (e.g. macro-economic variables such as credit growth
figures as in the Spanish ‘dynamic provisioning’ model) and imposing the same
rudimentary target for all banks would fail to capture the risk profile of individ-
ual banks. This would also not take into account differences in the modelling of
Basel II capital minimum capital charges: i.e. whether the internal models are
based on the ‘through-the-cycle’ or ‘point-in-time’ methodologies for internal rat-
ings, or on something in between.
I also hold a strong view against having public authorities determining when a
capital buffer should be built-up or when banks could move down from the target
level towards the minimum capital charge. This idea of public ‘engineering’ is
currently quite strongly held by e.g. European policy makers.
There are several reasons why it will not possible to allocate this responsibility to
any public authority, domestic or international. First, large banks have global
portfolios and economic fluctuations are not synchronised across countries. A
publicly determined use of capital buffers cannot take into account the specifics
of banks’ individual portfolios. Second, it could be difficult for supervisors to
coordinate the required buffers for a cross-border financial group and its different
entities. Third, it will not be possible to determine a suitable trigger point in terms
of macro-economic variables. Banks could, for instance, have positive profits
even when the economy has started turning down or the demand for credit has
slowed down. The lowering of the required capital level might not change any-
thing (credit development could be only demand rather than supply driven), or it
could come either too early or too late. A lot of discretion would need to be given
to public authorities, but then we would depart from the favoured rules-based
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approach. It is also doubtful whether public authorities could have the informa-
tion to spot supply constraints in credit granting, which should trigger a lowering
of the required capital level.
In sum, we should have a mechanism to determine the size of the buffer that is
based on individual banks’ internal models and specific portfolio composition,
maintains the risk-based measurement of capital charges and which automati-
cally allows for the depletion of the buffer when needed. Such a mechanism is
possible to be defined by determining the required buffer as a difference between
the capital levels calculated using risk parameters estimated for recessionary con-
ditions (i.e. recessionary PDs and LGDs) and those based on minimum capital
charges under the allowed Basel II methods (‘point-in-time’ parameters or
‘though-the-cycle’ parameters – i.e. current or average parameters over economic
cycles). The usual official definition of a recession could be referred to also in this
context.
In such a mechanism, banks would be required to have a capital buffer based on
recessionary parameters: PDs and LGDs estimated for historical recession periods
for each of their country and sector-based portfolios. This kind of an approach is
considered for banks’ and supervisors’ Pillar 2 dialogue by CEBS (2009b) to
judge the adequacy of banks’ current capital buffers. Such a methodology could,
in my view, form a basis for actual hard-wired regulation of banks’ capital buffers
when applied at the level of banks’ credit portfolios, or most preferably, at the
level of each internal rating grades.
In this approach, banks would be required to build-up and hold the capital buffer
as long as the current parameters (PDs and LGDs) are below the recessionary
ones. While rather complex, the calculation would based on banks’ existing mod-
elling approaches, but extending the data requirements to cover the past recession
periods. Pillar 3 disclosures should be expanded to cover the determination of the
capital buffer.
The beauty is that this kind of a buffer would be automatically depleted in a
recession without any need for discretion by public authorities. The extra capital
buffer would disappear when the risk parameters correspond to (or be above) the
currently prevailing parameters and the difference between the target level and
the minimum capital charge would be zero. Banks would also not be required to
acquire extra capital when economic conditions deteriorate as there would not be
an increase in the required level of capital in a recessionary period as happens
under the current pro-cyclical Basel II rules. This approach would also be consist-
ent with the previous recommendations of supervisors for banks to move towards
the ‘though-the-cycle’ measurement of risk parameters (while clearly more
demanding).
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The capital buffer requirement should be strongly enforced by supervisors, e.g.
by not allowing dividend pay-outs when the buffer is not in place. For small
banks following the standard formulas, an automatic buffer could also be devel-
oped based on the migration of external ratings in times of a recession. However,
the need would be much smaller than in the case of the internal models-based
approaches as they are much strongly pro-cyclical than the standard ones.
In effect, banks would be required to hold capital to cover the risk-levels in his-
torical recession periods, which would mean a significant increase in the capital
requirements in good times. A transition rule should be established to move to
these higher requirements, and the increase in the requirements should await,
naturally, the ending of the current recession. An increase in the required level of
capital from the levels calibrated for Basel II is justified in my view on the basis
of the experiences of the present crisis in addition to dampening pro-cyclicality:
many banks have clearly been too highly leveraged.
3.3.2. Do we need other measures?
There are dangers in a simple, non-risk based leverage ratio, which is currently
widely advocated as another capital adequacy yardstick. Having such a measure
could easily crowd-out the risk-based Basel II measure, resulting in a loss of their
beneficial features, unless it is used as a mere floor to Basel II measures, lowly-
calibrated to pick-up only extreme leverage levels and ‘outlying’ banks.
Such a measure could also be easily non-neutral by treating unevenly banks with
high amounts of regular on-balance-sheet exposures, such as retail mortgage
loans, unless off-balance-sheet items are accurately brought in the measure. Then
we are easily back in the complex measurement of exposures. I think it will be
much more advisable to remedy the observed shortcomings in Basel II measures
– also re-considering the correct calibration of the different exposure types, e.g.
real estate exposures – rather than embarking on the complex work on com-
pletely new types of capital charges.
Basel II framework is based on the idea of covering unexpected losses with capital
and the expected ones with accounting provisions. Under the IFRS rules, provi-
sions have not covered expected losses as the rules only allow provisioning
against incurred losses; hence creating a need for higher capital levels to cover the
share of provisions as well. A clear improvement would be represented by a sys-
tem where provisions would take up their appropriate role to cover expected
losses, preferably determined again on the basis of banks’ internal models. It
seems, currently, that the IFRS rules are being changed in this direction. This
would require a change in the present accounting standards. In a much less pro-
cyclical accounting system based on adequate provisions, the principle of mark-
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to-market, or fair asset valuation could be in my view more easily kept. Thus, we
could keep the favourable feature of early recognition of economic losses of the
current IFRS rules.
3.4. EFFECTIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN MICRO- AND 
MACRO-PRUDENTIAL AUTHORITIES
The most general lesson from the present crisis is that we will have to pay much
closer attention to the risks taken in the expansion phase and make sure that, at
the same time, adequate financial buffers (capital and provisioning reserves) are
created to withstand the risks and sound banking policies are maintained. Super-
visors will also have to look at the developments at the level of the entire financial
sector. One institution may look all right in relation to others, but the whole
industry may be accumulating huge concentrated risk positions. A typical feature
in the inflation of credit-asset bubbles has been ‘disaster myopia’, meaning that
private bankers may not sacrifice enough thought on the possibility that the
expansion in credit and asset prices might one day come to an end. Adopting a
more cautious strategy could also mean significant loss of market share. It may
have to be the task for supervisors and central bankers to challenge the industry
in such instances.
The crisis has shown that central banks’ macro-prudential supervision has lacked
tools to mitigate systemic risks. In practice, the most important avenue for macro-
prudential concerns to result in corrective action is to work through micro-pru-
dential regulatory and supervisory standards. Conversely, macro-prudential anal-
ysis can be of great significance for micro-prudential supervisors as they tradi-
tionally focus on individual institutions’ risks rather than risks in the financial
system as a whole. Hard separation of the two functions would risk leading to a
situation in which neither central banks nor supervisory authorities would be able
to perform their functions satisfactorily (Crockett 2000).
The institutional framework has been built on the segregation of the duties of the
micro-prudential supervisors and central banks exercising macro-prudential
oversight. The recently agreed framework for supervision in the EU based on
newly created EU bodies: European Systemic Risk Board and three sectoral Euro-
pean Supervisory Authorities, represents a chance to develop strong co-operation
between micro- and macro-prudential supervision and the necessary regulatory
and supervisory actions to counter financial stability risks. The framework is still
based, however, on the separation of micro-and macro prudential supervision
into different structures, and there could be obstacles to smooth cooperation and
information gathering. Having the prudential supervision of banks and other
institutions conducted within or closely linked with central banks would over-
come this separation.
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The information demands of effective macro-prudential supervision at the Euro-
pean level are high. Confidential information on systemic entities has to be
pooled together at the EU and even global levels as it is not possible for national
authorities to monitor all contagion links between institutions, or monitor the
stability risks to integrated money and capital markets and payment systems
(Enria and Vesala 2003). Information needs to be collected without constraints at
the EU level also because national authorities may not have the incentives to
inform of risk exposures of their national institutions due to conflicts of interest.
The data on individual cross-border groups should be shared freely in supervisory
colleges as well, including all national supervisory authorities of such groups.
Moreover, crisis management decisions would easily be sub-optimal if conducted
only from a national perspective. Hence, there are clear needs for strong EU-level
decisions and co-ordination in such matters.
Take as an example that a problem would emerge for a major player in the inter-
bank market. The assessment of the potential for contagion would require infor-
mation, which resides with other central banks and supervisors, while the home
country authorities are only able to assess the ‘first-round effects’. Bilateral
arrangements may be activated to signal the problem to all the supervisors of the
banks with which the ailing institution has large exposures. But how could the
impact of the ‘second-round effects’ be assessed without a fully-fledged multilat-
eral setting?
A shared ‘too big to fail’ bias in rescue policies would virtually eliminate this co-
ordination problem, but only at the cost of heightening moral hazard. If it is
agreed that banks, which do not give rise to major systemic problems, should be
allowed to exit the market; multilateral co-operation should be in place to assess
the real scope for contagion in the interbank market at the EU-wide level. The
need for multilateral co-operation is even more pronounced when there is wide-
spread tension affecting a large number of participants in the market, due, for
instance, to a common external shock causing a drying-up of liquidity.
Even if the systemic relevance of the crisis were correctly assessed, co-ordination
is required to effectively activate the policy tools. There could be a problem in
terms of cost sharing, particularly if systemic implications in other Member States
are relevant. In addition, the tools to be activated might take into consideration
damage limitation at the domestic level only. For instance, the central bank may
decide to provide liquidity support to the domestic lenders, thus encouraging
other central banks to intervene as well. Alternatively, an ‘orchestrated solution’
could be sought, which does not take due consideration of the legitimate rights of
all foreign creditors.
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3.5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have argued against responding to the present crisis by ‘eliminat-
ing’ the sources of systemic risks. This response can be tempting, but it would
cause too a high efficiency loss and would probably be unenforceable in any case.
Instead, the sources of systemic risks should be ‘managed’ within the present risk-
based prudential regulation and supervision framework. While supervision
should be graduated and more intensive for systemic institutions, financial regu-
lation should be neutral with respect to size and business model in order not to
cause further distortions.
More specifically, I supported:
– development and effective supervision of stronger risk management stand-
ards for especially systemic institutions;
– focusing more on concentration risks (including business model risks) by
institutions and supervisors and limiting contagion risks via diversification
requirements;
– requiring limits on risk concentrations that could be life-threatening via
‘reverse stress tests’;
– strengthening the Pillar 2 supervisory process that all material risks are cov-
ered by institutions’ risk and capital management processes irrespective of
legal structures and seeing to that supervisors have adequate powers;
– demanding higher capital buffers to limit the pro-cyclicality of the Basel II,
basing the size of the buffer on banks’ own risk parameters and data for
recession periods;
– limiting the role of the simple leverage ratio (if any) to a simple and lowly-
calibrated floor for capital adequacy;
– changing accounting rules to allow for provisions to cover expected losses
over economic cycles;
– eliminating the strict separation of the macro-and micro-prudential supervi-
sion;
– having unconstrained pooling of information for macro- and micro-pruden-
tial purposes, and developing stronger centralised co-ordination of supervi-
sory and crisis management decisions regarding major systemic financial
groups in the EU.
References
ACHARYA, V. and SCHNABL, P. (2008): Restoring Financial Stability: How to
Repair a Failed System, NYU Stern publications.
BORIO, C and LOWE, P. (2002): “Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Stability:
Exploring the Nexus”, BIS Working Papers, 114, July.
SUERF2010_4.book  Page 28  Tuesday, August 3, 2010  8:17 AMHOW TO BRING IN SYSTEMIC RISK CONSIDERATIONS? 29
larcier
BUITER, W. (2009): Too Big to Fail is too Big, June.
CEBS (2009a): Report on Supervisory Powers, available on CEBS website.
CEBS (2009b): Report on Capital Buffers against Economic Fluctuations, availa-
ble on CEBS website.
CROCKETT, A. (2000): Marrying Micro and Macro-prudential Supervision,
Speech delivered at the 11th Conference of Banking Supervisors, Basel, Sep-
tember.
DE LAROSIÈRE (2009) Report on Reforming the EU Framework for Supervision,
February.
DEWATRIPONT, M. and TIROLE, J. (1993): The Prudential Regulation of Banks,
Editions Payot, Lausanne.
ENRIA, A. and VESALA, J. (2003): “Externalities in Financial Supervision: The
European Case”, in J. KREMER, D. SCHOENMAKER and P. WIERTSIN (eds.),
Financial Supervision in Europe, Elgar.
FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM (FSF) (2009): “Addressing Pro-cyclicality” in The
Financial System, restricted circulation, April.
GORDY, M. and HOWELLS, B. (2006): “Pro-cyclicality in Basel II: Can We Treat
the Disease without Killing the Patient”, Journal of Financial Intermedia-
tion, 15, 395-417.
GROPP, R. and VESALA, J. (ed.) (2003): “Markets for Bank Subordinated Debt
and Equity” in Basel Committee Member Countries, Basel Committee Wor-
king Paper, 12.
GROPP, R. and VESALA, J. (2004): “Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market
Monitoring”, Review of Finance, 8, 4.
KASHYAP, A., RAJAN, R. and STEIN, J. (1999): “Banks as Liquidity Providers. An
Explanation for the Co-Existence of Lending and Deposit-Taking”, Journal
of Finance, 57(1), 33-73.
MAYES, D, PRINGLE, R. and TAYLOR, M. (2009): Towards a New Framework for
Financial Stability, Central Banking, London.
MERTON, R. and BODIE, Z. (1993): Deposit Insurance Reform: A Functional
Approach, Carnegie Rochester Series on Public Policy 38, North Holland,
1-34.
PADOA-SCHIOPPA, T. (2004): Regulating Finance, Balancing Freedom and Risk,
Oxford University Press, Oxford.
RAJAN, R. (2008): The Causes and Consequences of the Current Financial Crisis,
mimeo.
TURNER REPORT (2009): A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis,
UK FSA, March.
SUERF2010_4.book  Page 29  Tuesday, August 3, 2010  8:17 AMSUERF2010_4.book  Page 30  Tuesday, August 3, 2010  8:17 AM31
larcier




The current framework of voluntarily cooperation in Europe fails to produce the
public good of financial stability. The paper identifies coordination failures and
argues for European arrangements. An integrated approach is needed. The start-
ing, and politically most controversial, point is a binding burden sharing agree-
ment to deal with cross border banks in problems. Further ingredients are estab-
lishing a European System of Financial Supervision, with powers at the European
level, and entrusting the ECB with a mandate for financial stability. In addition,
the ECB should also get a tool to manage financial stability. The proposals of the
de Larosière group (2009) only incorporate some of these ingredients.
The quest for financial stability in Europe should also look at the incentive struc-
ture to give information. Currently, supervisors have no incentive to provide cen-
tral banks with up to date information about potential problems in financial insti-
tutions. Moreover, national central banks do not always timely share stability
concerns in their domestic financial system with the ECB.
4.1. INTRODUCTION
The 2007-2009 financial crisis is instructive to see how the European framework
for financial stability stands up in practice. In a historical summit of the euro-area
leaders, President Sarkozy presented an impressive concerted European action of
the euro-area countries to face the challenges of the financial crisis (Summit,
2008). The action plan was based on voluntary cooperation among the govern-
ments. The declaration of this euro area summit, which was subsequently been
broadened to the European Union, introduced an action plan with three main
measures:
1. ensuring appropriate liquidity conditions for banks. The ECB provides ample
liquidity to banks against adequate collateral;
2. facilitating the funding of banks. National governments provide a guarantee
for medium term funding of banks. These government guarantees cover
medium term bank debt issuance with a maturity ranging from 3 months up
to 3 to 5 years;
3. recapitalising banks. Governments provide capital injections to restore Tier 1
capital at an appropriate level. Furthermore, governments may allow for an
efficient recapitalisation of distressed banks.
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How has the institutional framework in the EU coped with this action plan? On
the first measure, the ECB has been very successful to ensure appropriate liquidity
in the euro-area interbank market throughout the financial crisis. In this crisis,
surplus banks have become unwilling to lend to deficit banks because of worries
about their solvency related to losses on sub-prime mortgages. The ECB is pro-
active and provides short-term funds to deficit banks and absorbs funds from
surplus banks. In this capacity of general lender of last resort, the ECB provides
liquidity to the banking system as a whole against adequate collateral.
On the second measure, individual governments provide the funding guarantees.
The ECB managed to broker a common fee across the EU. The market for bank
funding is integrated and a common fee ensures a level playing field. For maturi-
ties up to 1 year, there is a flat fee of 50 basis points. The fee for maturities from
1 year up to 3 to 5 years is based on the credit default swap spread of the involved
bank plus 50 basis points.
The third measure is the most intriguing. To recapitalise banks, supervisors and
governments have to cooperate. Supervisors have the information on the severity
of the problems at the banks in trouble, while governments have the deep pockets
(based on their fiscal powers) to provide capital if needed. These supervisory and
fiscal functions are currently executed at the national level. Supervisors and gov-
ernments have been effective in dealing with troubled banks with a primarily
national orientation. The summit declaration has been successful in fostering
some consistency between the national approaches though there are some differ-
ences.
The main problem has been with truly cross-border banks. The institutional set-
ting with national authorities was not capable to reach a collective approach for
Fortis, a cross-border bank with its main operations in the Benelux countries. The
crisis management was done on national lines. When Fortis was first recapital-
ised, the Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg governments provided capital injec-
tions to the national banking parts (Fortis Bank, Fortis Bank Netherlands and
Fortis Bank Luxembourg respectively) and not to the Fortis Group as a whole.
When the first recapitalisation of EUR 11 bn proved to be insufficient, Fortis was
torn apart along national lines: the Dutch parts nationalised by the Dutch gov-
ernment and the solvent Belgian/Luxembourg parts sold to BNP Paribas.
So, what do we learn from the 2007-2009 financial crisis? First, coordination
may be wanting. Present crisis arrangements are primarily national based. Coor-
dination works when the interests of the national governments are aligned. As all
governments without exception were severely hurt by the crisis, they had a strong
incentive to sign up to the Sarkozy plan1. But if national interests diverge, coor-
1 Even stronger, Germany had domestic political problems to get an action plan for the German financial system
agreed and used the European plan to push ahead domestically.
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dination breaks down. The Fortis case is an illustrative example. Schinasi (2007)
and Schoenmaker (2010) analyse coordination of decision-making in a group of
countries. They find that the provision of shared financial stability public goods
results in a sub-optimal equilibrium, even though each country views its own
decision as optimal. The authors suggest adopting a supranational approach.
This paper examines the need to put crisis management at a European footing.
A second lesson to be drawn from the crisis is the urgent need to upgrade macro-
prudential supervision in the European Union. Supervisors have focused on the
individual players in the system (micro-prudential supervision) rather than the
financial system as a whole (macro-prudential supervision). Financial imbalances
may be building up in the system, while individual players are looking fine. This
point was already known before the crisis, both in academic circles (e.g. Hart-
mann, Straetmans and de Vries, 2004) and policy circles (e.g. Borio, 2003). Hart-
mann et al. (2004), for example, investigated whether financial markets crash
jointly. The more markets crash simultaneously, the more in danger are even large
banks that hold widely diversified trading portfolios. A High Level Group chaired
by former managing director of the IMF Jacques de Larosière (2009) stresses that
central banks have a key role to play in a sound macro-prudential system. The
ECB and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) should receive an explicit
formal mandate to assess high-level macro-financial risks to the system and to
issue warnings where required in order to fully play their role in preserving finan-
cial stability. Moreover, we believe that the ECB should not only give warnings,
but also needs a tool to manage financial stability.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the current arrangements
for financial supervision and stability in the EU. Taking a holistic view, it pro-
poses a more streamlined division of powers between the national and the Euro-
pean level. Section 4.3 looks at financial supervision. The new proposals of de
Larosière (2009) for the establishment of European Supervisory Authorities are
discussed. Section 4.4 analyses the new framework for macro-prudential supervi-
sion. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2. NEED FOR EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK
The establishment of one single, unified European financial system, plus a com-
mon eurozone currency, raises the issue of the appropriate level (federal or
national) for managing financial stability. The emergence of pan-European banks
has stimulated the debate on European arrangements for financial supervision
and stability. The search to establish an appropriate division of labour between
home and host supervisors in the European Union is part of this debate. The fiscal
competence to deal with banking crises and the banking supervisory function are
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inter-related. It is not possible to move on one of these without the other (Good-
hart, 2004).
Table 1 presents an integrated framework for financial supervision and financial
stability. There are three stages in the process: preventive, remedial and resolu-
tion. In the preventive stage, new entrants in the financial system need to apply
for a license and are screened by the supervisor. After entry, the supervisor per-
forms ongoing supervision. At the level of financial stability, central banks exam-
ine the robustness of the financial system. If there are weaknesses, they redesign
the infrastructure. Examples are the move to real-time gross settlement for large
payments (TARGET) at the start of EMU and the current move to more efficient
and safer settlement of securities (TARGET2-Securities)2. The ongoing monitor-
ing of threats to the stability of the financial system culminates in the publication
of a Financial Stability Review.
In the remedial stage, supervisors take action if they see problems emerging. They
could, for example, ask for improvements of internal controls or remove manag-
ers. Other important tools are liquidity and capital requirements. Supervisory
capital requirements for individual banks typically differentiate across the riski-
ness of assets (cross-sectional). Moving to financial stability, central banks could
put a liquidity charge on banks if they find an overreliance on short term funding
of longer-term assets. Another tool is increasing capital requirements across the
board for all banks if they find that credit growth is excessive and risks are under-
priced. This anti-cyclical application of capital requirements differentiates over
time (longitudinal).
In the resolution stage, authorities have to deal with a crisis at one or more finan-
cial institutions. The toolkit ranges from closure and private sector solutions (e.g.
a take-over of a weak bank) to public support of liquidity (lender of last resort)
or capital by the government (De Haan et al., 2009). Liquidity and capital can be
given either to individual banks or more generic to the banking system as a whole.
Table 2 provides the current division of powers in the European Union. The
supervisory tools are in the realm of national authorities. Although there is some
coordination in the level 3 supervisory committees (CEBS, CEIOPS, CESR), for-
mal powers rest firmly at the national level. The stability tools are more of a
mixed bag. Both the ECB and national central banks are active in improving the
infrastructure and publishing financial stability reviews. There are no financial
stability tools at the remedial stage. This is an important gap in the toolkit, both
in Europe and elsewhere. In Section 4, we discuss proposals for such remedial
2 It should be noted that the payment system for interbank payments, TARGET, held up remarkably well during
the severe liquidity problems in the interbank market in Autumn 2008. The concept of real-time gross settle-
ment, in which processing and settlement take place continuously (‘in real time’) and gross payments are based
on adequate cover, has contributed to the robustness of the payment system.
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tools. At the resolution stage, there is a split between general LOLR responsibility
for the ECB and general capital support by national governments.
Table 1. Toolkit for financial supervision and stability
Table 2. Current division of powers
This mixed picture of Table 2 raises two issues. First, at which level should finan-
cial supervision and stability be managed? Second, are the different tools interre-
lated? There has been an extensive discussion in the literature on the appropriate
level of supervision and stability (e.g. Vives, 2001; Schinasi, 2007; Decressin
et al., 2007; Schoenmaker and Oosterloo, 2008; Schoenmaker, 2010). Financial
stability is a public good, as the producer cannot exclude anybody from consum-
ing the good (non-excludable) and consumption by one does not affect consump-
tion by others (non-rivalness). An important question is whether governments
can still produce this pubic good at the national level in today’s globalised finan-
cial markets. Especially in Europe, an important challenge for maintaining finan-
cial stability arises from cross-border banking. Pan-European banks may create
cross-border externalities in case of (potential) failure. The interaction of highly
penetrated banking systems and national financial stability management might be
a dangerously weak institutional feature. The reason is that national authorities
have a mandate for maintaining financial stability in their own system and they
may therefore be reluctant to help solving problems in other EU Member States.
To formalise this issue, Freixas (2003) examines two different models of recapi-
talising banks: a single country and a multi-country model (see also Schinasi,
2007, and Schoenmaker, 2010). Freixas finds that the multi-country model has a
multiplicity of equilibria, In particular, the closure equilibrium may occur as no
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individual country is ready to finance the recapitalisation of a cross-border bank
itself, even if it is efficient to recapitalise the bank. Current national based
arrangements undervalue externalities related to the cross-border business of
financial institutions. As a result, insufficient capital will be contributed and the
financial institution will not be bailed out. This model pinpoints the public good
dimension of collective bailouts and shows why improvised co-operation will
lead to an under-provision of public goods, that is, to an insufficient level of
recapitalisations. Countries have an incentive to understate their share of the
problem so as to incur a smaller share of the costs. This leaves the largest country,
almost always the home country, with the decision whether to shoulder the costs
on its own or let the bank close, and possibly be liquidated. The outcome of the
Freixas-model is consistent with Schinasi (2007). Applying the theory on ‘eco-
nomics of alliances’, he examines decision-making in a group of countries. Schi-
nasi (2007) also concludes that the provision of shared financial stability public
goods results in an equilibrium that is sub-optimal from a European perspective,
even though each country views its own decision as optimal and has no incentive
to change its resource allocation decision if other countries maintain theirs.
Moving to the second issue, there are different views. On the hand, some argue
that the arrangements for supervision and stability can be considered separately
(Posen and Véron, 2009). According to this view, supervision could be moved to
the European level, while leaving the more thorny issue of burden sharing aside
and keep the core of crisis management (capital support by the government) at
the national level. On the other hand, it is argued that the tools are interrelated
(Goodhart, 2004; Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 2006). The framework should be
incentive compatible. What is the incentive for a national supervisor to put in
sufficient effort, when the costs of failing supervision are shared with other coun-
tries? Would national governments be prepared to support ailing banks, when a
European supervisor has neglected its duty?
In this paper, we take the view that supervision and stability are interrelated. The
question is then where to start designing the division of powers in Table 2. Good-
hart and Schoenmaker (2006) propose a backward-solving approach starting at
the bottom right (general capital support). The guiding principle for decision-
making on crisis management is “he who pays the piper calls the tune”. So long
as recapitalisations are organised and paid on a national basis, the national gov-
ernments will normally want to oversee and undertake the function of supervi-
sion. That is the current set-up for financial supervision and crisis management,
which are nationally organised. As there is no fiscal back-up to the ECB, the ECB
is happy to let the national central banks (NCBs) take the lead on individual
lender of last resort operations. Only when recapitalisations would be done at the
European level, then supervision and stability could also be moved to the Euro-
pean level.
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Summing up, the Freixas-model indicates a need to put potential recapitalisations
on a European footing. The backward-solving approach in turn suggests that the
other crisis management tools as well as supervision should also be moved to the
European level.
4.3. FINANCIAL SUPERVISION (MICRO PRUDENTIAL)
A typical distinction is between micro and macro prudential supervision. Micro
prudential supervision (i.e. financial supervision) focuses on the risks within indi-
vidual institutions and does not address any effects on the wider financial system
(externalities). Financial supervision is the working territory of supervisory agen-
cies. By contrast, macro prudential supervision focuses on the stability of the
financial system as a whole. Financial stability is the working territory of central
banks. This section examines financial supervision. Different proposals to estab-
lish a European structure of financial supervision have been put forward, as doc-
umented by Decressin et al. (2007) and Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2008). The
three main policy options are:
1. appoint a lead supervisor for the supervision of cross-border financial groups.
In practice, this will mean that the home country authority of a pan-European
financial group is given full responsibility for the EU-wide operations, both
branches and subsidiaries;
2. establish a single EU supervisor either for all EU banks or merely for the large
cross-border banking groups (i.e. a so-called two-tier system), and;
3. establish a European System of Financial Supervisors, in which a central
agency works in tandem with national supervisors. The role of the central
agency is to foster cooperation and consistency among members of the Sys-
tem, but could leave the day-to-day supervision of cross-border financial
groups with the consolidating supervisor.
4.3.1. Lead supervisor
According to the European Financial Services Round Table (EFR, 2005), a clearly
defined lead supervisor (usually the home supervisor) for prudential supervision
of large cross-border financial institutions would be an important step towards a
more coherent and efficient supervisory framework in the EU. The lead supervi-
sor should in particular be the single point of contact for all reporting schemes,
validate and authorise internal models, approve capital and liquidity allocation,
approve cross-border set-up of specific functions, and decide about on-site
inspections. Furthermore, the lead supervisor should not only be responsible for
supervision on a consolidated level, but also on the level of individual subsidiar-
ies.
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The EFR agrees that host countries should be involved in the supervisory process,
as local supervisors have generally a better understanding of the local market
conditions. The EFR suggests forming colleges of supervisors (one for each spe-
cific group) in which all supervisors involved share relevant group-wide and local
information regarding the financial group in question. The lead supervisor, who
is the home supervisor of the parent company, would chair the college of super-
visors that would comprise, at a minimum, all supervisory agencies in whose
jurisdictions the financial institution has sizeable operations. The lead supervisor
would make intelligent use of the expertise and knowledge of the local supervi-
sors in the college and entrust tasks to them by means of the delegation of tasks
and, where appropriate, responsibilities. A mediation mechanism would be avail-
able if disagreements were to arise between the lead supervisor and other mem-
bers of the college.
In comparison with the current situation, the efficiency of supervision is enhanced
under this option as duplication is eliminated. Nevertheless, the lead supervisor
does poorly with respect to financial stability, as its national mandate does not
induce the lead supervisor to incorporate the cross-border externalities of a fail-
ure of a financial institution in its decision-making.
4.3.2. Single supervisor
Some have argued that developments in the EU banking sector call for establish-
ing a single pan-European supervisor (e.g. Schüler, 2002), which should assume
full responsibility for the supervision of both branches and subsidiaries of all EU
banks. There may indeed be merit in centralising day-to-day supervision and
pooling of information, allowing for effective market surveillance of European-
wide systemic risks. A major drawback of a central European supervisory author-
ity could however be that the distance between the central authority and the
supervised institutions may be too large – both physically as well as in terms of
familiarity with local circumstances. Bank supervision may therefore be better
executed at the local level, because of the availability of specific expertise of the
local market.
Another option would be to set up a two tier system, i.e., a system in which large
cross-border banking groups are supervised by a central pan-European supervi-
sory authority, while local banks are supervised by the existing national supervi-
sory authorities. This option may however risk creating an un-level playing field
in supervision between pan-European banks and banks operating at the national
level, while both are competing on the same market. The potential problems with
respect to the distance to the activities of the large cross-border banking groups
may also be applicable to this option.
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4.3.3. European System of Financial Supervisors
Vives (2001) and Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2008) propose to establish a
European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) with a European Financial
Authority (EFA) at the centre of the system and national supervisory authorities
(NSAs) in the different countries. Such a system could be set up along the lines of
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). A key issue is the appropriate level
of (de)centralisation of the central authority. Supervision is primarily a micro-
policy as day-to-day supervision should be conducted close to supervised institu-
tions. Nevertheless, there may be some merit in centralising policy-making and
pooling information, allowing effective market surveillance of European-wide
systemic risks. The drawback of a central European supervisor could be that the
distance between the central authority and the supervised institutions may be too
large – physically and in terms of familiarity with local circumstances.
A decentralised ESFS could combine the advantages of a European framework
with the expertise of local supervisory bodies. Figure 1 illustrates such a frame-
work with an EFA at the centre working in tandem with the 27 decentralised
national supervisory branches. A crucial element of the proposal is that the ESFS
operates under a European mandate. In this proposed system, small and medium-
sized banks (as well as insurers) which are primarily nationally oriented, are
supervised by one of the 27 national supervisors. Pan-European banks are super-
vised by the consolidating or lead supervisor (usually the supervisory team of the
home country). This national supervisor will be the single point of contact for all
reporting schemes (no reporting to the host authorities), validate and authorise
internal models, approve capital and liquidity allocation, approve cross-border
set-up of specific functions and decide about on-site inspections. With respect to
the latter, the lead supervisor can ask host authorities to perform on-site inspec-
tions on its behalf. The lead supervisor is compelled to inform host authorities
about its activities and host authorities should have access to all reporting
schemes (i.e., a common database of the ESFS). If a host authority feels the lead
supervisor does not take account of its interests and no agreement can be reached,
it can present its concerns to the EFA. If necessary, the EFA can overrule the lead
supervisor and enforce the European mandate.
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Figure 1. A decentralised European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS)
Source: Schoenmaker and Oosterloo (2008)
Crisis management is also done on a European basis. While the national supervi-
sor in the home country takes the lead during a crisis at an individual institution
(gathering information, making an assessment of the situation), the ESFS is
involved to ensure an adequate EU-wide solution. When a crisis hits more (large)
financial institutions at the same time, the involvement of the EFA (in close co-
operation with the ECB) will be intensified.
Key supervisory decisions (for example, the assessment of potential cross-border
mergers and acquisitions or crisis management decisions) as well as the design of
policy are done at the centre by the Governing Council consisting of the Executive
Board of the EFA and the Chairmen of the 27 National Supervisory Authorities
(in the same way as the ESCB takes decisions on monetary policy). In this way,
host country authorities are fully involved and the interests of their depositors are
fully taken into account (i.e., potential cross-border externalities are incorpo-
rated). Day-to-day supervision is conducted by one of the 27 national supervisors
close to the financial firms. The EFA will be responsible for information pooling
and is therefore best equipped to perform EU-wide peer group analysis of large
European financial groups.
The EFA is responsible for the correct and uniform application of supervisory rules
(level playing field) and it can also act as a mediator in case of problems between
home and host country authorities. In doing so, it may give instructions to the 27
national supervisors. A drawback of a system with a central authority and 27
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4.3.4. De Larosière proposals on micro-prudential 
supervision
In October 2008 the European Commission mandated a High Level Group
chaired by former managing director of the IMF Jacques de Larosière to give
advice on the future of European financial regulation and supervision. The Group
presented its final report on 25 February 2009 and their recommendation pro-
vided the basis for legislative proposals by the Commission later that year.
After having examined the present arrangements and in particular the coopera-
tion within the level 3 supervisory committees, de Larosière (2009) considers that
the structure and the role bestowed on the existing European supervisory com-
mittees are not sufficient to ensure financial stability in the EU and all its Member
States. It is argued that although the level 3 committees have contributed signifi-
cantly to the process of European financial integration, there are a number of
inefficiencies which can no longer be dealt with within their present legal struc-
ture (i.e. as advisory bodies to the European Commission). To address the ineffi-
ciencies, de Larosière (2009) makes a clear choice for the third model, i.e., the
European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).
The ESFS should constitute an integrated network of European financial supervi-
sors, working with enhanced level 3 committees, i.e., the latter would be trans-
formed into European Supervisory Authorities. De Larosière (2009) argues that
this would be a largely decentralised structure, fully respecting the proportional-
ity and subsidiarity principles of the EU Treaty. Existing national supervisors,
who are closest to the markets and institutions they supervise, would indeed con-
tinue to carry-out day-to-day supervision and preserve the majority of their
present competences. However, in order to be in a position to effectively supervise
an increasingly integrated and consolidated EU financial market, the European
Authorities will carry-out a defined number of tasks that are better performed at
the EU level. De Larosière (2009) therefore argues that, in addition to the com-
petences currently exercised by the level 3 committees, the Authorities should
have the following key-competences: (i) legally binding mediation between
national supervisors; (ii) adoption of binding supervisory standards; (iii) adop-
tion of binding technical decisions applicable to individual financial institutions;
(iv) oversight and coordination of colleges of supervisors; (v) designation, where
needed, of group supervisors; (vi) licensing and supervision of specific EU-wide
institutions (e.g. credit rating agencies). But the final step of replacing the national
mandates by a European mandate is not proposed.
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4.3.5. An expanded LOLR role for the ECB
In the current national setting for financial supervision and stability, the individ-
ual LOLR operations and possible recapitalisations of banks are in the realm of
national authorities (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999). So, the NCBs are performing the
individual LOLR operations. If and when the financial supervision and stability
arrangements are moved to the European level, the ECB as central bank is well
placed to play the individual LOLR role (Boot and Marinč, 2009). The ECB
would incorporate the cross-border externalities of possible bank failures in its
decision-making. A centralized LOLR function would thus optimise the LOLR
decision, as argued in Secton 4.2. The current Statute of the ESCB would allow
this LOLR role (art 18.1). Another advantage of a centralized LOLR is that it
could lead to a more prudent use of the LOLR facility (Vives, 2001; Boot and
Marinč, 2009). The ECB has less of an incentive to ‘protect’ national banks (other
than for systemic risk reasons) than national central banks.
A key issue is how to deal with the credit risk on LOLR operations. Although
officially LOLR support is meant to deal with liquidity problems of banks, liquid-
ity problems often turn into solvency problems (Goodhart and Schoenmaker,
1995). So LOLR operations are risky. Central banks can create unlimited
amounts of liquidity, but their capacity to bear losses is constrained to their cap-
ital base. Governments are typically the owner of central banks and thus the pro-
vider of capital. There is a national government behind each national central
bank. But who will assume the credit risk on the LOLR operations of the ECB3?
That question has not yet been answered by European politicians. Goodhart and
Schoenmaker (2009) argue for burden sharing rules among national governments
to deal with the credit risk on LOLR and possible recapitalisations of ailing
banks. Such burden sharing will only work if the rules are agreed ex ante and are
legally binding. The argument for burden sharing is that systemic risk in an inte-
grated EU financial system can only be managed at the EU level (see 4.3.2.). The
burden of this systemic risk management should subsequently be shared by the
beneficiary countries of the maintained stability of the financial system. But at the
political level, there has been little support so far from politicians to give up part
of their sovereignty with regard to spending tax payers’ money.
3 Art. 32 of the ESCB Statute specifies that income from monetary operations (i.e. seigniorage) as well as any
losses will be shared among the participating NCBs according to their capital key in the share capital of the
ECB. However, a decision to take up the individual LOLR role at the ECB would need political endorsement.
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4.3.6. Information challenge
As LOLR to individual banks, the ECB would need to have full access to super-
visory information on these banks. This information is crucial to make an
informed judgment about the solvency and liquidity position of a bank in prob-
lems (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). This is a major challenge in a supervi-
sory structure where central banking and supervision is separated. The bank run
on Northern Rock in 2007 is a clear illustration of this challenge. Up to the very
last moment, the Bank of England was unaware of the funding problems (caused
by the underlying maturity mismatch between LT assets and ST funding) at
Northern Rock. An effective LOLR needs to be closely linked to the prudential
supervisor. Padoa-Schioppa (2003), therefore, argues for implementing the twin
peaks model in Europe. In this twin peaks model, there is a prudential supervisor
looking at the solvency of financial institutions (internal dimension) and a con-
duct of business supervisor looking at the treatment of customers (external
dimension). Padoa-Schioppa is in favour of the central bank performing the pru-
dential supervisory task. The ECB would then combine monetary policy and pru-
dential supervision and consequently have direct access to supervisory informa-
tion on banks. However, the ECB is not likely to get a direct role in micro pru-
dential supervision.
As explained below, de Larosière (2009) suggests establishing a new independent
body, the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), in which the ECB, the NCBs
and European Supervisory Authorities operate. In the set-up of the ESRB, atten-
tion should be paid to a proper incentive structure so that both the central banks
and the supervisors will inform each other timely within the newly envisaged
structure4. Otherwise, the ESRB runs the risk to become just another talking
shop.
4.4. FINANCIAL STABILITY (MACRO PRUDENTIAL)
The case for macro prudential supervision has been reinforced by the current
financial crisis. Financial imbalances may be building up in the system, while
individual players are looking fine. This point was already known before the cri-
sis, both in academic circles (e.g. Hartmann, Straetmans and de Vries, 2004) and
policy circles (e.g. Borio, 2003). Hartmann et al. (2004), for example, investi-
gated whether financial markets crash jointly. The more markets crash simulta-
neously, the more in danger are even large banks that hold widely diversified
4 Boot and Marinč (2009) argue that national authorities could be more willing to share information with the
ECB, since only then support can be expected. But on the negative side, there is the bureaucracy effect (Kremers
and Schoenmaker, 2009). Bureaucratic agencies are notoriously bad in exchanging information. In the Northern
Rock case, the second effect has dominated.
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trading portfolios. The number of markets affected by a crisis situation may also
determine the severity of any real effects that might follow. Hartmann et al.
(2004) find evidence that stock market returns are statistically dependent during
crises. Nevertheless, the present EU supervisory arrangements place too much
emphasis on the supervision of individual firms, and too little on the macro-pru-
dential environment in which these firms operate.
What are the key channels for system risk in the financial system? The first chan-
nel through which shocks propagate from one financial institution (or market) to
another is linkages among financial institutions. In the case of the failure of Leh-
man Brothers in September 2008, it appeared that many financial (and non-finan-
cial) institutions were exposed to Lehman Brothers. Worries about the vulnera-
bility of Lehman’s counterparties caused a general loss of confidence in the finan-
cial system. The second channel is common exposures. Joint failures may arise
from common exposures to shocks that come from outside the financial system
(e.g. exposures to sub-prime mortgages). Next, to these systemic risk channels,
pro-cyclicality amplifies the negative or positive effects throughout the cycle. The
dynamics of the financial system and the real economy reinforce each other. In
good times, banks have ample capital (through retained earnings) causing or con-
tributing to asset bubbles and credit booms. Conversely, in bad times, banks face
reduced capital (through losses) and tighten lending standards leading to credit
crunches.
The task of macro prudential supervision is to identify these channels and to
mitigate these sources of instability. This is typically a central bank task for two
reasons. First, monetary and financial stability are interrelated. Failures or dis-
ruptions in the financial system have an impact on the real economy, with related
effects on output and inflation. Reversely, monetary (or broader macroeconomic)
imbalances may lead to financial instability. The current financial crisis has inter
alia been fed by a prolonged period of overly expansionary monetary policy. Sec-
ond, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) identify the need for macroeconomists to be
involved in macro prudential supervision. Goodhart et al. (2002) have conducted
a cross-country survey of the skill profile of central bankers and supervisors.
Using a dataset of 91 supervisory agencies, they find that central banks employ
more economists and fewer lawyers in their supervisory/financial stability wing
than non-central bank supervisory agencies do. Economists have the capacity to
analyse the impact of macro-economic trends on the financial system as a whole.
The empirical findings of Goodhart et al. (2002) suggest that a setting with cen-
tral bank involvement in macro prudential supervision is more likely to produce
a macro-approach than a setting without such central bank involvement.
SUERF2010_4.book  Page 44  Tuesday, August 3, 2010  8:17 AMTHE QUEST FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY IN EUROPE 45
larcier
4.4.1. De Larosière proposals on macro-prudential 
supervision
De Larosière (2009) argues that a key lesson to be drawn from the crisis is the
urgent need to upgrade macro-prudential supervision in the EU for all financial
activities. In the report of the High Level Group it is stressed that central banks
have a key role to play in a sound macro-prudential system. However, in order
for them, and in particular the ECB/ESCB, to be able to fully play their role in
preserving financial stability, they should receive an explicit formal mandate to
assess high-level macro-financial risks to the system and to issue warnings where
required.
It is therefore suggested to establish a new independent body, the European Sys-
temic Risk Board (ESRB), responsible for safeguarding financial stability by con-
ducting macro-prudential supervision at the European level. The ESRB would
include the members of the ECB/ESCB General Council (the President of the ECB,
the Vice-President of the ECB and the Governors of the 27 central banks), plus
the Chairs of the three European Supervisory Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and
ESNA) and a member of the European Commission. To ensure appropriate geo-
graphical coverage and a well-balanced composition, de Larosière (2009) rightly
proposes to cast the ECB/ESCB’s involvement in the format of the General Coun-
cil, which includes the NCBs of all 27 EU Member States, rather than that of
Governing Council, which includes only the NCBs of the 16 euro area countries.
The main task of the ESRB would be assessments of stability across the EU finan-
cial system in the context of macro-economic developments and general trends in
financial markets. If significant stability risks are foreseen, the ESRB would pro-
vide early warnings and, where appropriate, issue recommendations for remedial
action. The addressees of warnings and recommendations would subsequently be
expected to act on them unless inaction can be adequately justified.
4.4.2. Financial stability tools needed
De Larosière (2009) is silent on the tools for macro prudential supervision. It is
all very well to do analysis and, if needed, to give warnings/recommendations.
But what if nobody listens? We argue that the ECB needs a tool to actively man-
age financial stability. Tinbergen, the first winner of the Nobel prize for econom-
ics, already taught us that you need one instrument for each policy goal. The ECB
serves the two goals of monetary and financial stability. As the ECB has a clear
instrument, setting the interest rate, to serve monetary policy, it also needs a clear
instrument for financial stability. The ECB can then pro-actively decide about
applying the tool. The proposed ESRB can subsequently be used to liaise between
macro and micro supervision.
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So, what is needed are preventive tools to manage aggregate risk creation at times
of exuberant markets. Two different tools are proposed in academia. The first
proposal is to revisit Basel’s system of capital requirements and make it more
cycle-neutral (e.g. Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Kremers and Schoenmaker, 2009).
The Basel system is geared towards the stability of individual financial institu-
tions, and does little to take account of their interaction with their environment
and its stability. Capital requirements that “breathe with the cycle”, however
imperfect because difficult to design, may help avoid banks overly expanding
credit when capital is ample in boom-time and, conversely, help avoid them tight-
ening credit in the aftermath precisely when this is least conducive to financial
stability. A simple way to introduce countercyclical capital buffers is to scale the
minimum capital requirement multiplicatively. When credit or GDP growth is at
its neutral level, the multiple is set to 1. If credit/GDP growth is above trend, the
multiple is proportionally set above 1. Vice versa, the multiple is set below 1, if
credit/GDP falls below trend. The challenge is to get a proper indicator for credit
and GDP growth and to establish the required adjustment to the minimum capital
requirement.
A second proposal is to impose liquidity charges. Perotti and Suarez (2009) argue
that in all crises which spread beyond the original shock, liquidity runs which
force fire sales are a main cause of propagation. If systemic crises involve liquidity
runs which only liquidity insurance by central banks can absorb, then it is appro-
priate for the central bank to be responsible to monitor the buildup of risk and to
manage the liquidity insurance provision with effective tools. Perotti and Suarez
(2009) propose to establish a mandatory liquidity charge, to be paid continuously
during good times to the central bank which, in exchange, will provide emergency
liquidity during systemic crisis. The charge would be set according to the princi-
ple that future regulation should work like Pigouvian taxes on pollution, discour-
aging bank strategies that create systemic risk for everyone. Hence, it should be
increasing in the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, and should be
levied on all financial institutions with access to the LOLR. So, if the ECB
observes an increase in short term funding of a bank (while asset maturities
remain constant), it will increase its liquidity charge for that bank.
Moving to crisis management, the ECB needs a tool to resolve a general financial
crisis affecting the whole financial system. For that purpose, the ECB can act as
general LOLR flooding the interbank market with liquidity when needed. The
Statute of the ESCB provides the basis for this classical central banking tool
(art. 18.1) “In order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its
tasks, the ECB and the national central banks may … conduct credit operations
with credit institutions and other market participants, with lending based on ade-
quate collateral”. So, the ECB needs to take adequate collateral. During the 2007-
2009 financial crisis the ECB has expanded the range of eligible collateral. As the
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range of collateral expands beyond safe assets such as Treasuries, credit risk
increases. The ECB has made a provision of EUR 5.7 billion for the increased
credit risk of its general LOLR operations. The NCBs have underwritten this
provision according to their capital key in the share capital of the ECB (De Neder-
landsche Bank, 2009, p. 174). As each NCB is backed by its own government, the
ECB’s expansion of collateral rules is implicitly underwritten by the national gov-
ernments of the euro area. By expanding its role as general LOLR, the ECB is
coming close to becoming an individual LOLR to (ailing) banks.
While implicit for general LOLR operations, burden sharing becomes explicit
when moving to general capital support operations. Capital support to ailing
banks can only be given by governments which have deep pockets. Currently,
national governments support national banks. That is the picture throughout the
2007-2009 financial crisis. Only US head-quartered banks were eligible for sup-
port by the programmes of the US Treasury. Similarly in Europe, only Iris head-
quartered banks were eligible for capital support from the Irish government,
while banks from other EU countries were left in the cold. To resolve this ten-
dency to disintegrate in Europe (and beyond), a supranational approach is
needed. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (2009) propose to move to legally binding
burden sharing rules for LOLR and capital support operations for cross-border
banks. See 4.3.3. for a full discussion.
4.4.3. Information challenge
Timely information on the condition of financial institutions and markets in the
EU is crucial to make an up-to-date assessment of the stability of the EU financial
system and to act swiftly when needed. A main challenge for the ESRB to work
is a full flow of information from NCBs and national supervisors to the ECB. We
discuss here the information flow between central banks (see 4.3.3. for the infor-
mation flow between central banks and supervisors). Game theory suggests that
the envisaged arrangements are not incentive compatible. The ECB has a mandate
for the stability of the EU-wide financial system (European mandate), while the
remit of NCBs is limited to the stability of their respective national financial sys-
tem (national mandate). If the interests of the ECB and the NCBs are aligned,
NCBs may provide the necessary information to the ECB. But if there is a conflict
of interests between a NCB and the ECB, then there is no incentive for this NCB
to provide timely information. A case in point are emerging problems with a
national bank in one of the EU Member States. While a NCB may have an incen-
tive to help a major player of their national banking system and to wait (and
hope) for better times (forbearance), the ECB may want to act swiftly to prevent
the problems spreading to the wider EU financial system (prompt corrective
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action). However, without the information from the NCB who is closer to the
bank in problems, the ECB cannot act timely.
The solution to this incentive problem is to align mandates. We propose to
remove the national mandate of NCBs and replace it with a European mandate.
This has been the case for monetary policy from the start of EMU. The Maas-
tricht Treaty provides the ESCB (both the ECB and the NCBs) with a clear man-
date to maintain price stability in the euro area. In this setting, Governors of
NCBs are not allowed to vote on the basis of their respective national inflation
outlook.
4.5. CONCLUSION
The current framework for financial supervision and stability is a hotpotch of
national and European powers. The quest for financial stability in this paper has
resulted in the conclusion that we need streamlined European arrangements for
both financial supervision and financial stability.
The de Larosière proposals (2009) go some way. The first steps are set towards
establishing European Supervisory Authorities at the centre of a European System
of Financial Supervision with national supervisors and European supervisors.
National supervisors keep their mandate and the new European Authorities get
the power of binding mediation in case of conflicts. We propose to set also the
final step and move from a collection of national mandates in each country to a
European mandate for the proposed European System of Financial Supervisors.
On the financial stability front, the ECB should not only get a task, but also a tool
to manage financial stability. We discuss two possible tools for the ECB: a coun-
ter-cyclical capital charge and a liquidity charge. In the further design of the Euro-
pean Systemic Risk Board, in which the ECB, the NCBs and the European Super-
visory Authorities participate, due attention should be paid to incentives for
information flows between supervisors and central banks and between national
agencies and European agencies. A move from national mandates to a European
mandate may also be helpful here.
Finally, and most importantly, we can only move to European arrangements if the
problem of burden sharing for cross-border banks is solved (Goodhart and Sch-
oenmaker, 2009). A move to burden sharing is politically the most controversial
decision to take. At the same time, this decision would be necessary to make
progress on the quest for financial stability in Europe.
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5. ASSISTANCE TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
IN DISTRESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CENTRAL 
BANKS
Nicola Brink and Michael Kock
Abstract
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 differs from previous ones in sev-
eral ways: in its severity, its origins, its global nature and widespread effects on
financial and economic conditions across the world. The magnitude of the crisis
and the speed with which its effects spread across the world also distinguished it
in respect of the extent of actions that governments and central banks had to take,
both on an individual and coordinated basis, to stabilise financial markets and
limit the effects on real economic activity. Central banks and governments of
(mostly) the developed countries reacted by providing general market support,
specific support to financial and other institutions, as well as significant fiscal
packages to support economic sectors and stimulate demand.
This paper focuses on the implications of these interventions for central banks
themselves, through their balance sheets, as well as a number of possible future
policy implications of these interventions.1 Three central banks have been selected
as case studies, based on their global importance as well as the extent of their
interventions, namely the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), the Bank of England
(the BoE) and the European Central Bank (the ECB). The analyses have been
restricted to these three central banks because this number was regarded as ade-
quate to illustrate the balance-sheet effects of various interventions without
becoming too cumbersome.
The structure of the paper is as follows: As a general background, the generic
types, characteristics and classifications of central bank intervention are
described. With this in mind, the interventions of the three central banks during
the height of the crisis (August 2008 until June 2009) are described and the effects
on their respective balance sheets are illustrated. This is followed by a discussion
of a number of possible policy implications for the future.
1 In addition to central banks, governments have also provided large amounts of fiscal support in various forms,
directed either at stabilising financial institutions or stimulating their economies. However, this paper only
focuses on the support provided by central banks and some policy implications specific to central banks. A
comprehensive record of total financial sector rescue plans and the specific measures that were used was
published by the BIS in July 2009 (BIS, 2009c).
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5.1. GENERIC CHARACTERISTICS AND TYPES OF CENTRAL 
BANK INTERVENTION
The most distinguishing characteristics of central banks – typically supported by
special legislation and legal powers – are that:
– they issue banknotes and coin, thereby creating new money;
– they are the sole creators or destroyers of central bank liquidity in the finan-
cial system and;
– they have the ability to set the level of short-term interest rates – either
through a deficit system (lending money in the money market at a lending
rate) or by influencing the demand and supply of bank reserves in the money
market (i.e., by influencing liquidity conditions). This ability provides central
banks with the tool most commonly used to influence inflation (Kock &
Brink, 2008: 24).
As part of their implementation of monetary policy in normal times, central
banks use their unique ability to create or destroy liquidity2 to influence money-
market conditions in order to maintain short-term interest rates at levels close to
their policy rates. They typically inject new liquidity into money markets by
increasing their assets or decreasing their liabilities, both of which result in credit
entries into commercial banks’ current accounts with the central bank. Such
liquidity injections can be either of a permanent nature (for example through
outright purchases of financial or other assets), or temporary, for example repur-
chase transactions or extending loans to the banking sector. Central banks would
increase liquidity whenever market interest rates rise above the policy rate, thus
putting downward pressure on market rates as banks try to offload this addi-
tional liquidity on each other in the interbank market.
Central banks can also use their ability to create liquidity3 in order to assist finan-
cial institutions in distress, for example by providing emergency liquidity assist-
ance (ELA) to specific institutions. Likewise, they can choose to augment the
overall level of liquidity in a financial system for purposes other than the imple-
mentation of monetary policy. This has been done extensively by the major cen-
tral banks during the crisis, as described in subsequent sections of the paper.
2 It is useful to make a distinction between narrow central bank liquidity and broader market or aggregate
liquidity. The former is created and destroyed through transactions between the central bank and the banking
sector, which result in changes in banks’ balances with the central bank. The latter refers to the ease with which
banks can fund growth in their assets. Adrian and Shin (2008) defines aggregate market liquidity as the rate of
growth in the aggregate balance sheets of financial institutions, and found in a study that aggregate liquidity is
strongly pro-cyclical. If the growth in banks’ balance sheets consistently exceeds that of other sectors of the
economy, a situation of surplus market liquidity (or easier monetary conditions) exists.
3 This paper does not distinguish between interventions aimed to achieve either monetary policy or financial
stability objectives, as the two objectives have been interwoven during the crisis period under review. This
approach differs from, for example, that of Meier (2009), which focused on unconventional monetary policy
interventions.
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Conversely, central banks can destroy existing liquidity either permanently or
temporarily. Liquidity is destroyed when a central bank reduces its assets or
increases its liabilities, both of which would result in debiting commercial banks’
current accounts with the central bank. An outright sale of securities would result
in a permanent draining of liquidity, while a sale on a repurchase basis would
result in a temporary draining. A central bank would typically drain liquidity
from the money market if market interest rates fall below its policy rate. By
creating a shortage of liquidity, the central bank puts upward pressure on market
rates as banks try to source additional liquidity from each other in the interbank
market.
The conventional set of instruments used by central banks to influence money-
market liquidity is fairly standardised. The most commonly used instruments are
(BIS, 2008):
– short-term collateralised loans to, or deposits from banks;
– short-term repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions to smooth daily
liquidity fluctuations;
– short-term foreign exchange swaps to smooth liquidity conditions;
– issuing their own paper to drain excess liquidity;
– outright sales and purchases of financial securities to permanently increase or
reduce the level of liquidity in the market; and
– longer-term repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions to address liquid-
ity imbalances that are expected to persist for some time.
With the exception of some off-balance sheet activities and valuation accounts,
which normally should not be significant, all factors that influence money-market
liquidity conditions can be derived from changes in the assets and liabilities of
central banks.
Table 1 presents a generic balance sheet framework that can be applied to most
central banks, reflecting their various operations and how these relate to the main
central bank functions. Against this generic framework, the impact of the three
central banks’ interventions during the crisis is discussed in the next section4.
4 All balance sheet data used in the analyses were sourced from the respective central banks’ websites.
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Table 1. Generic balance sheet structure of central banks
5.2. NATURE, SIZE AND BALANCE-SHEET IMPACT OF 
INTERVENTIONS BY SELECTED CENTRAL BANKS
Since the onset of the recent financial crisis, the conventional objective of central
bank intervention in the major industrial countries has become much broader,
and liquidity management has also become a tool to help restore financial stabil-
ity. A distinction can therefore be made between conventional, or ‘normal’ (mon-
etary policy) interventions (i.e., those aimed at maintaining market interest rates
at a desired level), and ‘special’ interventions (i.e., those aimed at achieving objec-
tives related to the stability of the financial system). Some of the activities that
had been conventional in nature, such as repurchase transactions and reverse
repurchase transactions, have become ‘special’ in terms of the size of these trans-
actions, their duration or the wider range of collateral that has been accepted.
In this section, the operations of each of the Fed, the ECB and the BoE are dis-
cussed, making a distinction between normal and special operations. The analy-
ses focus on the period from August 2008 until June 2009, during which period
most of the central banks’ activities were observed. Graphs 1 (a) and (b) show
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and October 2008. This was when the crisis intensified following the failure of
Lehman Brothers, while the ECB’s balance sheet also showed significant growth,
albeit less that that of the Fed and BoE. Although the balance sheets have shrunk
since their peaks in October 2008, they were still almost twice as large by June
2009 than in August 2008. Expressed in US dollar, the three central banks’ bal-
ance sheets in total increased from about USD 2.6 trillion in August 2007 to a
peak of about USD 5.4 trillion in December 2008, declining somewhat to
USD 4.5 trillion by June 2009 (Graph 1(c)).
Graph 1. Balance sheets of the Fed, ECB and BoE in their respective currencies
The nature of the activities and interventions that lead to the substantial growth
and change in composition of balance sheets in each case is described separately
in subsequent paragraphs.
5.2.1. The Federal Reserve System
5.2.1.1. Operations and crisis intervention
In normal circumstances, the Fed implements monetary policy by influencing the
federal funds rate to fluctuate close to a targeted policy level. This is achieved by
aligning the supply of balances held by depository institutions (banks) at the Fed
– the so-called reserve balances – with banks’5 demand for such balances, through
open-market operations. The Fed’s conventional open-market operations com-
prise the outright selling or purchasing of securities in order to increase or reduce
bank reserves on a permanent basis, as well as repurchase and reverse repurchase
transactions to have a temporary effect on bank reserves. Outright purchases of
US Treasury securities via purchases had traditionally accounted for the bulk of
the Fed’s open-market operations portfolio. Repurchase transactions are used to
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respond to volatility in the supply of and demand for reserve balances and to
forecasted changes in autonomous factors that affect reserve balances (Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, 2009; Federal Reserve System, 2009).
From December 2007, the Fed introduced a number of new facilities to address
increasing strains in financial markets. These facilities were introduced to address
escalating problems in financial markets as the crisis evolved. The new facilities
through which liquidity was provided to the market in general can be broken
down into three broad classes that evolved over three periods (Dudley, 2009):
The first class of intervention relates to additional liquidity facilities extended to
banks in general. In addition to the Fed’s discount window facility, through which
liquidity strains in individual banks or the banking system are normally met,
Term Auction Facilities (TAF) for banks were introduced in December 2007 to
alleviate the freezing up of interbank financing markets. The Term Securities
Lending Facility (TSLF) and Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) for primary
dealers were introduced in March 2008. The Fed also entered into swap agree-
ments with the major central banks to channel dollar liquidity across borders.
These swap amounts peaked at USD 552 billion in December 2008, declining to
USD 115 billion by June 2009.
The second class of general market intervention was when the Fed expanded its
provisioning of short-term financing beyond banks and primary dealers, to
highly-rated corporate borrowers that experienced funding or liquidity con-
straints (Dudley, 2009). The need for this intervention was caused by the mal-
functioning of credit markets, which made it difficult for corporates to access
funding. The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) was introduced in Sep-
tember 2008, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF) was
announced in November 2008, but in fact only implemented in March 2009. At
its peak in November 2008, the CPFF contributed USD 355 billion to the growth
in the Fed’s balance sheet, but this has since declined to USD 122 billion by June
2009.
The third class of general market intervention relates to the expansion of the types
of assets that the Fed started to buy as interest rates approached zero. In order to
put downward pressure on longer-term borrowing rates, the Fed purchased the
debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the mortgage-backed securities that
they issue. It also started to buy longer-term Treasuries (Dudley, 2009). As a
result, the Fed’s holdings of mortgage-backed securities increased from zero in the
beginning of 2009 to USD 462 billion by June 2009.
In addition to the three classes of general support provided to the market, the Fed
also provided support to a number of specific institutions, namely Bear Stearns,
American International Group (AIG), Citigroup and Bank of America (New York
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Fed, 2009; Bernanke, 2009c). Assistance to Bear Stearns and AIG were conducted
through separate limited-liability companies (Maiden Lane I, II and III) as subsid-
iaries under the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Assistance to Citigroup and
Bank of America comprised a combination of financial support and contingent
liabilities in the form of guarantees and access to liquidity and capital, negotiated
in cooperation with the US Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC).
5.2.1.2. Balance sheet analysis
The interventions and facilities described in the previous section had a significant
impact on the size as well as the structure of the Fed’s balance sheet. These inter-
ventions were focused on the asset side rather than the liability side of the Fed’s
balance sheet. According to Dudley (2009), the purpose of acting on the asset side
of the balance sheet was deliberate, as the Fed attempted to alleviate illiquidity in
certain asset classes by lending funds against such assets and expanded its asset
holdings via purchases of less liquid agency debt, mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) and Treasuries. The increase in excess reserves in the system on the liability
side was a by-product of these actions, rather than an objective.
Graph 2 shows the impact that the various facilities had on the size and compo-
sition of the balance sheet of the Fed. The growth in assets between October 2008
and January 2009 (Graph 2(a)) was largely attributable to increased lending
through the TAF, outstanding reciprocal dollar swap agreements with other cen-
tral banks, CPFF commercial paper holdings and other loans. The holdings of the
various limited liability rescue funds totalled USD 75 billion by the year-end, thus
contributing only marginally to the balance sheet growth. ‘Other assets’ also
increased significantly between September and December 2008. The Fed does not
publish a breakdown of this item, but states that it includes the daily revaluation
effects on other assets denominated in foreign currencies. It could include the
value of foreign exchange holdings related to central bank liquidity swaps, which
the Fed only started to report separately from January 2009.
SUERF2010_4.book  Page 57  Tuesday, August 3, 2010  8:17 AM58 THE QUEST FOR STABILITY: THE FINANCIAL STABILITY VIEW
larcier
Graph 2. Composition of the Fed’s balance sheet
From March 2009, balance sheet growth was mainly driven by increased hold-
ings of securities. Between the end of February 2009 and the end of June 2009,
outright holdings of US Treasury securities increased by USD 179 billion, while
holdings of agency debt and MBS increased by USD 60 billion and USD 398 bil-
lion, respectively. Total assets remained relatively stable as some of the other facil-
ities started to mature.
During August and September 2008, the main source of funding on the Fed’s
balance sheet was increased Treasury deposits (Graph 2(b)). The US Treasury
established a special account with the Fed in order to assist with the draining of
reserve balances from banks (Bernanke, 2009a). However, as the Fed increased
the amount of liquidity in the system and the interbank market became dysfunc-
tional, banks deposited increasing amounts of the ‘excess’ liquidity with the Fed.
In addition, the Fed started to pay interest on excess reserve balances of deposi-
tory institutions from September 2008, as part of its strategy to influence the level
of the fed funds rate.
Reflecting these factors, deposits by banks increased sharply between September
and December 2008, replacing US Treasury deposits as the main balancing item
on the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet. These deposits – also referred to as
the monetary base – increased from USD 19 billion in August 2008 to USD 819
billion in December 2008, peaked at USD 845 billion in May 2009 and declined
to USD 726 billion by June 2009.
The Fed’s capital account amounted to only USD 48 billion in June 2009, com-
prising about 2.4 per cent of the total balance sheet6.
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5.2.2. The Bank of England
5.2.2.1. Operations and crisis intervention
Within the sterling monetary framework, the operations of the BoE aim to align
overnight money-market interest rates with its policy rate (the rate at which it
lends to financial institutions) in order to create a flat risk-free money-market
yield curve. Because the BoE is the final provider of cash to the system at the end
of each settlement day, it can choose the interest rate at which it will provide these
funds every day. The interest rate at which the Bank supplies these funds is
quickly passed on throughout the financial system, influencing interest rates for
the whole economy (BoE, 2008a).
In normal conditions, the BoE’s operational framework has four main elements,
namely:
– the averaging of target reserve balances by banks over a maintenance period
from one meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) to the next meet-
ing;
– operational standing facilities for deposits and collateralised lending for eligi-
ble UK banks and building societies that may be used on demand. The lending
or deposit rates are, respectively, 25 basis points higher or lower than Bank
Rate;
– a discount window facility at which eligible banks and building societies may
borrow gilts for up to 30 days, against a wide range of collateral in return for
a fee; and
– open market operations (OMOs) to provide to the banking system the
amount of central bank liquidity needed to enable reserve-scheme members,
in aggregate, to achieve their reserve targets. OMOs comprise short-term
repos at Bank Rate, long-term repos at market rates determined in variable-
rate tenders and outright purchases of high-quality bonds (BoE, 2009a).
The BoE responded to the crisis with significant reductions in its policy rate,
aimed at stimulating the economy through increased aggregate demand. It also
made changes to its existing market operations in order to stabilise market inter-
est rates and to alleviate pressures on bank funding. The main changes were:
– conducting repurchase transactions to inject additional reserves;
– extending the size and frequency of sterling long-term repurchase operations;
– extending the range of eligible collateral
 for long-term repurchase transac-
tions under the government’s Credit Guarantee Scheme (CGS);
– extending the drawdown for new debt under the government’s Credit Guar-
antee Scheme (CGS);
– establishing a new guarantee scheme for Asset-Backed Securities (ABS);
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– extending the drawdown period under the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS);
and
– extending the Discount Window Facility (DWF).
However, as interest rates approached zero, the policy rate became a less effective
monetary policy instrument. This necessitated the direct injection of money into
the economy, or ‘quantitative easing’, which embodied a shift in the monetary
policy instrument from the price of, to the quantity of money. Quantitative easing
was facilitated by the BoE and the HM Treasury through a process of engaging
in a range of exceptional operations as part of a comprehensive package that
began in October 2008 to deal with the tensions and problems related to money
and funding in the sterling markets.
On 19 January 2009, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that an Asset
Purchase Facility (APF) would be introduced. The BoE was authorised to create
a wholly-owned subsidiary – the Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund
Limited – with all losses for the account of HM Government. The BoE published
details of the APF on 6 February 2009 and announced on 5 March 2009, that its
interest rate policy will be supplemented by quantitative easing through the APF.
With effect from 6 March 2009 the purchases of private sector securities under
the APF was financed by central bank reserves rather than through the issuance
of Treasury Bills by the Debt Management Office (DMO). Those securities
already financed by means of Treasury Bills will be held to maturity. The pur-
chases of gilts in the secondary market will also be financed by central bank
reserves. Asset purchases provide an additional tool to help the MPC meet its
objectives. Through these purchases, the BoE seeks to influence the quantity of
money in the economy by injecting additional reserves. The BoE retained its influ-
ence over market rates, as these are affected by both the level of the policy rate
and the amount of reserves that the BoE is injecting. Asset purchases shifted the
focus of monetary policy, but not the overall objective of meeting a 2 per cent
inflation target (Benford et al., 2009).
Beyond the sterling markets the BoE, in co-operation with a number of other
central banks, offered to lend US dollars at a range of maturities since September
2008. The US dollar financing offered to the UK banking system through US
dollar repo operations was extended and funded through swap transactions with
the Federal Reserve.
In practice, the MPC now votes on, and is accountable for both the appropriate
level of interest rates and the amount of asset purchases. After its meeting on
5 March 2009, the MPC announced a programme to purchase GBP 75 billion of
medium and long-term government bonds and private sector debt, financed by
the issuance of central bank reserves. In May, the MPC increased the size of the
programme to GBP 125 billion. It surprised the market on 6 August by increasing
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the amount of quantitative easing by another GBP 50 billion, to GBP 175 billion.
The objective of this policy is to boost the supply of money in the economy, ease
conditions in corporate credit markets and, ultimately, to raise the rate of growth
of nominal demand to ensure that the inflation rate meets the target in the
medium term (BoE, 2009b). However, the BoE has also been criticised for contin-
uing to raise the amount of quantitative easing that this is used as a means of
monetizing government debt, given the limited effect that these interventions have
on boosting credit extension and broad money supply (e.g. Nixon, 2009).7
5.2.2.2. Balance sheet analysis
The operations and interventions of the BoE aim to stabilise market interest rates
and to manage and support liquidity in the banking system, the extent of which
is reflected in the change in the aggregate size and structure of its balance sheet.
The BoE’s consolidated balance sheet consists of the balance sheets of the Issue
and Banking Departments. The Issue Department’s balance sheet consists of ban-
knotes in issue and the corresponding assets, while that of the Banking Depart-
ment reflects all other assets and liabilities.
Similar to the Fed, the direct injection of money through quantitative easing was
mostly facilitated through transactions on the asset-side of the BoE’s balance
sheet. Graph 3 (a) shows the composition of assets on the consolidated balance
sheet of the BoE. The growth in the balance sheet of the BoE was driven mainly
by banks’ utilisation of the longer-term sterling reverse repo facility from Septem-
ber 2008, which replaced the BoE’s normal short-term open-market operations.
In addition, ‘other assets’ increased significantly in October 2008 and onwards,
comprising mainly foreign currency swaps with the US Fed. There was no notice-
able increase in the BoE’s holdings of securities, but ‘other assets’ increased sig-
nificantly, most likely reflecting holdings of assets by its subsidiary in terms of the
APF, which amounted to about GBP 100 billion by the end of June 2009.
7 This issue is further discussed in a later section on policy implications.
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Graph 3. Composition of the BoE’s balance sheet
On the liability side of the BoE’s balance sheet, the sources of funding varied over
time (Graph 3(b)). Between September and December 2008, short-term open-
market operations – the instrument with which the BoE drained the additional
liquidity provided through longer-term sterling reverse repos – increased. In addi-
tion, other liabilities also increased significantly from September 2008. These lia-
bilities largely reflected counter-entries of the foreign exchange swaps conducted
with the Fed.
In contrast to the Fed, the interventions of the BoE did not result in an increase
in the monetary base until the end of March 2009. Both bank reserves and notes
and coin in circulation remained relatively unchanged. However, as the BoE
drained less sterling liquidity through short-term open-market operations and the
BOE started to implement its policy of quantitative easing in full force, bank
reserves with the BoE increased from GBP 44 billion at the end of March 2009 to
GBP 135 billion at the end of June 2009. The BoE does not report any capital on
its balance sheet.
5.2.3. The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem8
5.2.3.1. Operations and crisis intervention
The primary objective of monetary policy in the euro area is the maintenance of
price stability. The ECB subscribes to the principle of the ‘long-run neutrality’ of
money, which is related to the assertion that inflation is ultimately a monetary
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phenomenon. The link between monetary policy and the price level begins with
the setting of official interest rates and central bank operations. The Governing
Council sets three key interest rates in the euro area that determine the monetary
policy stance, namely the interest rate on main refinancing operations through
fixed or variable rate tenders: on the deposit facility for overnight deposits and
on the marginal lending facility for overnight credit.
The ECB uses various monetary policy instruments to align short-term money
market interest rates with the minimum bid rate on the main refinancing opera-
tions, which serves as a signal of the monetary policy stance. The main instru-
ments used are the following:
– main refinancing operation (reverse repurchase transactions);
– longer-term refinancing operations (reverse repurchase transactions);
– fine-tuning operations (repurchase transactions, foreign exchange swaps,
outright transactions and fixed-term deposits);
– structural operations (repurchase transactions, outright transactions, issu-
ance of debt instruments);
– standing facilities (marginal lending facility and deposit facility); and
– minimum reserves.
The ECB responded to the crisis with significant reductions in official interest
rates and liquidity management interventions. The first strains in liquidity condi-
tions already appeared in August 2007, at which time the ECB reacted by provid-
ing additional liquidity through its normal channels. In October 2008, the crisis
intensified and the ECB started to allot more liquidity than normal in its refinanc-
ing operations by adopting a fixed-rate, full-allotment tender procedure, through
which banks had access to essentially unlimited liquidity. In addition to extending
the main refinancing operations, amounts allotted in terms of long-term refinanc-
ing operations also increased. Liquidity provisioning was supplemented by the US
dollar overnight TAF, funded through swap transactions with the Fed.
In May 2009, the maturity of the long-term refinancing operations was extended
from six to 12 months. All refinancing operations were conducted at fixed rates
with full allotment against a broader range of eligible collateral. The ECB already
had a large number of counterparties participating in its operations even before
this crisis, but this number increased even further during the crisis (Trichet,
2009). The ECB also announced that it would start to purchase euro-denomi-
nated covered bonds issued in the euro area.
Trichet (2009) noted that the different responses between the ECB and the Fed
could be explained by differences in financial structures: In the euro area, the
financial system is much more bank-based, and therefore the ECB’s non-standard
measures were much more focused on the banking sector. Another reason for the
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differences could be that the ECB is a much younger central bank than the Fed,
with its statutes and processes more aligned to a modern banking system.
5.2.3.2. Balance sheet analysis
The operations and interventions of the ECB are reflected in the change in the
ECB’s balance sheet in aggregate size and composition. In normal conditions, the
ECB supplies most of the liquidity to the banking system through the main refi-
nancing operations, supplemented by smaller amounts provided through longer-
term refinancing operations. The other operations, such as fine-tuning, struc-
tural, and standing facilities, only have a marginal impact. However, from Octo-
ber 2008, banks increasingly tendered for the ECB’s longer-term repos, and these
transactions, combined with some increase in the main refinancing amounts, con-
tributed to the growth in the ECB’s assets (Graph 6(a)). In June 2009, participa-
tion in the longer-term refinancing operations increased by EUR 325  billion,
reflecting strong demand for the extended one-year operations, at the expense of
liquidity obtained through the main refinancing operations. The increases in the
ECB’s holdings of euro-denominated securities reflect purchases of these securi-
ties by the ECB. From September 2008, foreign-exchange denominated claims on
euro residents increased as a result of US dollar liquidity provided in cooperation
with the Fed.
Graph 4. Balance sheet of the ECB
Graph 4(b) shows the main components of ECB liabilities. Notes and coin in
circulation represent 40 per cent of the ECB’s total liabilities. From October
2008, banks deposited increasing amounts in the ECB’s interest-bearing deposit
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increased from EUR 204 billion in August 2008 to EUR 492 billion in December
2008. It retreated somewhat in the first quarter of 2009, but increased again to
EUR 505 billion in June 2009 as the additional liquidity provided by the ECB on
the asset side of its balance sheet found its way back into banks’ various accounts
with the ECB.
At the end of June 2009, the ECB’s capital account amounted to EUR 73 billion,
representing about 3.7 per cent of total assets.
5.2.4. Summary of central bank interventions
The 2009 Annual Report of the BIS gives a useful summary of central bank
responses to the crisis as it evolved, and their various objectives. This summary is
partly reproduced in Table 2.
Table 2. Central bank responses to the crisis
Source: BIS 2009 Annual Report
Many of the interventions by central banks were short-term measures aimed at
stabilising financial markets and institutions. These operations were conducted
with little time and opportunity available to take into consideration possible
longer-term implications. As the crisis evolved, a number of policy implications
for the future emerged, some of which are discussed in Section 49.
Objective Measures adopted Fed ECB BoE
Achieve the official 
stance of monetary 
policy
Exceptional fine-tuning operations
Change in reserve requirements
Narrower corridor on overnight rate
Payment of interest on reserves
Increased treasury deposits
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Broadening of counterparties
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Corporate bond funding/purchase/collateral eligibility
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9 Due to the wide range of interventions and the limited focus of this paper, this is not a comprehensive list of all
possible policy implications. Due to limited length, the paper also does not address the issues of regulatory
reform and macro-prudential analyses and supervision.
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5.3. SOME FUTURE POLICY IMPLICATIONS
5.3.1. Risk exposures of central banks
Liquidity management operations did not only change the size and composition
of central bank balance sheets, but also the risk profile of central banks’ asset and
liability mix. Central banks responded to the sudden and extreme risk aversion
in financial markets and the rapid de-leveraging of financial institutions by taking
additional financial risk onto their balance sheets. They have effectively placed
their capital at risk to become market makers in a dysfunctional financial system
(Stella, 2009). As shown in the balance sheet analyses in the previous section,
central banks generally have very little capital available to absorb financial losses.
As a result, financial losses that may be incurred as a result of these actions are
eventually borne by the public, although in a less visible way than budgeted gov-
ernment spending.
Among the three central banks studied in this paper, the Fed has been the most
aggressive in this respect, in view of its substantial outright acquisitions of secu-
rities and uncollateralised loans that were granted. Due to the fact that credit in
the US is mostly extended through the financial markets, rather than the banking
system, the Fed’s interventions were also directed at the financial markets to a
relatively larger extent. By contrast, the ECB and BoE increased their provision
of liquidity mainly through collateralised refinancing operations with banks, and
although they accept a wider range of collateral in these transactions, these trans-
actions are inherently less risky than taking outright ownership of lower-grade
assets. Meijer (2009) agrees that the BoE, for example, pursued a very cautious
approach to credit risk by focusing its quantitative easing transactions on pur-
chases of government bonds and a few selected private sector assets. Only
towards the middle of 2009 did these two central banks venture into somewhat
more aggressive asset purchases. It should, however, be noted that even though
government bonds and high-quality assets may have limited credit risk, they also
expose the central banks’ balance sheets to the valuation effects associated with
market risk, and possible realised losses arising from assets sales in the future.
Stella (2009:28-33) classified the Fed’s assets according to their degree of risk and
estimated that on an overall risk exposure of USD 2.05 trillion, the Fed could face
losses of USD 183 billion, but concludes that the Fed has sufficient capital avail-
able to cover such losses. It should be noted, however, that the Fed has increased
its holdings of MBS significantly since the time of Stella’s study, making these risk
estimates probably somewhat optimistic.
Although the financial risks on the central banks’ balance sheets seem to be at
manageable levels, they are also exposed to non-financial reputational risks. Even
a small financial loss of a central bank could harm its credibility. Furthermore,
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there is much focus on the degree of success of central bank interventions, and
any failures in this regard could also have negative implications for central bank
functions, their credibility and their independence from government. For exam-
ple, the BoE has been criticised for using extensive quantitative easing as a means
to finance a fiscal deficit, with limited effect on the effectiveness of credit markets
(Nixon, 2009).
There may be more emphasis on and critique of the governance structure of a
public body charged with preserving financial sector stability and intervening in
financial markets by using public funds. The degree of transparency of central
bank intervention could also be affected (Stella, 2009; BIS, 2009b).
5.3.2. The monetary base, money-market liquidity and 
broad money supply
The relationship between narrow money supply (base money), broad money sup-
ply and inflation is a much debated issue. There is a lack of consensus, however,
not only on the links between money supply, the exchange rate and prices, but
also on the direction of causality. Monetarist theory proposes that there is a
strong link between the money stock, output and prices (e.g. Friedman, 1956,
Friedman & Schwartz, 1963), and that the chain of causality runs from the exog-
enous money supply to the price level and the exchange rate (as summarised by
Verengo, 2006). Opposing the monetarist views are the more structuralist theo-
ries, which attributes inflation to income distribution disparities between various
sectors or agents in the economy, developments in the supply side of an economy
and balance-of-payments constraints (Verengo, 2006).
The role that monetary aggregates play in monetary policy formulation has
diminished in importance, and central banks generally no longer have money
supply as an operational target. In a recent study, Woodward (2007) failed to find
any compelling reason to assign a prominent role to monetary aggregates in the
conduct of monetary policy, and it has indeed been the practice among an increas-
ing number of central banks to treat money supply as one of many possible fac-
tors that could influence inflation, and not necessarily the most important. A
notable exception to this is the ECB, whose two-pillar strategy still allows for a
monetary analysis to “exploit the long-run link between money and prices” (Ver-
engo, 2006).
Although the strength of the link between money supply and inflation can be
debated, there is little argument about the links between the monetary base, as
reflected in a central bank’s liabilities, and broad money supply. According to
Lacker (2009), “even though the conventional measure of the stance of monetary
policy is the central bank’s interest rate target, monetary policy fundamentally is
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always about the amount of monetary liabilities issued by the central bank – also
known as the monetary base”. The monetary base, and in particular bank
reserves, provide “the foundation upon which banks are able to expand their
liabilities and thereby increase the quantity of money”, which could be inflation-
ary in future (Laffer, 2009).
A complete picture of the extent to which recent central bank intervention could
add to money supply growth incorporates three aspects, namely (i) the extent to
which the monetary base has increased, (ii) the extent to which central bank
actions have increased money market liquidity and (iii), the extent to which an
increase in narrow money supply has transmitted itself into broad money supply.
With regard to the first issue, it is clear from the liability side of the central banks’
balance sheets that the monetary base (i.e., notes and coin in circulation, bank
reserves with the central bank and vault cash) has expanded markedly between
August 2008 and June 2009 in the US and the euro zone, by USD 784 billion and
EUR 380 billion, respectively. The monetary base in the UK remained fairly stable
until April 2009, but expanded by GBP 91 billion in May and June 2009.
An assessment of the second issue, namely the amount of liquidity that has been
injected into money markets, requires analyses of both the asset and liability side
of the central banks, that is, transactions that injected as well as drained liquidity.
Such analyses indicate that none of the three central banks injected large amounts
of liquidity on a net basis. In the case of the Fed, the liquidity that was created by
outright purchases of securities and assistance to troubled institutions through
various mechanisms was largely neutralised by increased bank and government
deposits at the Fed. In the euro area, liquidity providing assets of the ECB
increased by close to EUR 606 billion between August 2008 and June 2009, but
liquidity draining liabilities increased by about EUR 455 billion as banks tended
to deposit excess reserves with the ECB. The net effect on liquidity has therefore
been much smaller. In the UK, short-term liquidity-providing repurchase transac-
tions were replaced by longer-term transactions, and the increase in the amount
of additional liquidity created between August 2008 and June 2009 (about
GBP 90 billion) was neutralised by the draining impact of an increase in other
liabilities and short-term OMO’s until April 2009, and by increased bank reserves
in May and June 2009.
Regarding the third issue, bank reserves with the central bank have the ability to
fuel broad money supply and credit growth. One of the conventional objectives
of bank reserve requirements is to constrain growth in credit and the monetary
aggregates. It is, therefore, necessary to assess the extent to which the increase in
the monetary base has been transmitted to broad money supply. Graph 5 shows
that the ratio of narrow money supply (the monetary base) to broad money sup-
ply consistently declined until September 2008, but subsequently increased in the
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US and euro zone. This indicates that the higher monetary base in these econo-
mies did not translate into broad money supply, and that the money multiplier
effect has weakened significantly.
Graph 5. Relationship between narrow and broad money supply
Note: Calculated in domestic currency with country-specific definitions of money-supply. Sources: Central bank
statistical databases, Reuters data.
Analyses by the BIS, published it its quarterly review (2009a: 19-24), confirm that
commercial banks’ balance sheets globally contracted in the fourth quarter of
2008, with the largest contractions observed among European banks. The BIS
review also notes a decline of USD 880 billion in banks’ claims on the US non-
bank private sector. Most banks reported a shift from US non-bank private sector
into holdings of US Treasuries and other government securities.
A slightly different trend is observed in the UK, where the ratio continued to
decline. This was because the monetary base did not grow substantially, while
growth in broad money supply accelerated. The growth in broad money supply
was intended by the BoE, in order to stimulate domestic demand (BoE, 2009: 9).
The annual growth in broad money supply (M4) accelerated from around 12 per
cent in the fourth quarter of 2008 to around 18 per cent in the first quarter of
2009. However, the BoE explains in its June 2009 Inflation Report that the
increase in M4 money supply wholly reflected strong growth in money holdings
of institutions which intermediate between banks, such as settlement agents and
special purpose vehicles, which is not related to nominal spending. Growth in a
more economically relevant measure of broad money, which excludes such inter-
mediate institutions, has slowed markedly, from around 10 per cent in the begin-
ning of 2008 to below 4 per cent in the first quarter of 2009 (BoE, 2009b: 9,13).
It can be concluded that, until the first quarter of 2009 at least, the expansion in
the monetary base in the US and euro area did not fuel broad money supply in a
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did not increase excessively on a net basis in either the US, UK or euro zone.
However, as soon as inter-bank lending and securities markets return to normal-
ity, markets recover and real economies move out of recession, growth in private
sector credit extension and money supply is likely to accelerate, which could
become inflationary over the longer term as output gaps narrow again. Therefore,
it will be important for central banks to monitor the point at which the multiplier
accelerates again, and to be able to reduce the size of the monetary base as mar-
kets recover. The exit strategies of central banks and potential implications are
discussed in the next section.
5.3.3. Exit strategies and potential implications
Some tentative signs of recovery in financial markets were visible by June 2009.
In the euro area, the use of the ECB deposit facility started to decrease and over-
night unsecured interbank transaction volumes started to pick up since mid-Feb-
ruary, which signalled that conditions in the euro money markets had improved
(Papademos, 2009). Equity markets recovered somewhat, credit spreads nar-
rowed and implied volatilities fell (BIS, 2009).
Bernanke (2009a) stated that “we [the Fed] have taken care to design our pro-
grams so that they can be unwound as markets and the economy revive. In par-
ticular, these activities must not constrain the exercise of monetary policy as
needed to meet our congressional mandate…”. The central banks have a number
of tools available to exit from their support interventions and to drain bank
reserves in due course, such as wounding down lending programmes, selling secu-
rities and conducting reverse repurchase transactions. More specifically, effective
exit strategies would have to absorb liquidity and ‘reverse quantitative easing’ in
an orderly manner with a combination of the following measures:
– increasing interest rates;
– slowing down and eventually ceasing further asset purchases;
– holding assets to maturity and/or selling the assets with a concomitant reduc-
tion in central bank reserves and the redemption of government debt;
– reversing the swapping of bank assets for government securities;
– refraining from entering into further foreign exchange swaps and letting
existing swaps mature;
– rermitting the repayment of dedicated rescue funding subject to conditions
such as demonstrating the ability to raise equity and non-guaranteed debt;
– ceasing the extension of further government guarantees;
– returning to normal central bank refinancing operations;
– temporarily increasing banks’ statutory reserve requirements to reduce
‘excess’ reserves; and
– paying interest on reserves.
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However, throughout the winding down process it is crucial that inter-bank lend-
ing and credit extension to the private sector return to normality. Furthermore,
the secondary market for affected securities must be functional in terms of price
formation, as the market has to resume its role as provider of liquidity, which had
been taken over by central banks in extraordinary crisis conditions. The price-
adjustment process in the financial markets is unlikely to be smooth, and a
number of complications are possible.
While the corporate and banking sectors have de-leveraged their balance sheets
significantly since 2007, fiscal deficits in most major economies have ballooned.
The supply effect and possible impact on credit ratings could affect the price of
government debt relative to private sector debt. The focus will shift to fiscal dis-
cipline and how sales of securities by central banks and governments could be
managed without damaging the securities markets and the real economy.
The bond market could also be subjected to a disorderly adjustment. Sharp
increases in bond yields from their very low levels reached in the beginning of
2009 would reverse capital gains and could undermine central banks’ low interest
rate policies. Government bond yields are set to increase at a time when govern-
ments are heavily indebted. Higher bond yields will also raise the cost of mort-
gage debt at a time when household financial positions are still fragile. The wind-
ing down of central bank interventions could also be in conflict with government
debt management operations, as central banks will be selling bonds while govern-
ments are issuing significant amounts of new debt. This could result in an over-
supply of bonds. In these circumstances, central banks could be tempted to con-
tinue purchasing government bonds in an attempt to keep bond yields low. In this
way they would effectively be funding governments and monetising government
debt. Alternative approaches could be for central banks to lend short-term money
to banks with which to purchase government bonds, or for governments to
reduce the real cost of debt by accepting high inflation. These approaches will
undermine the exit strategies by increasing money-market liquidity and inflation,
respectively.
The extraordinary central bank interventions did not infringe the capacity of cen-
tral banks to maintain interest rates at target levels, as central banks conducted
transactions offsetting changes in reserve balances. Therefore, the unwinding of
these positions and shrinking of the central banks’ balance sheets to an appropri-
ate level should have a neutral effect on the target interest rates.
The desired outcome ought to be a more resilient market-based economy with
markets that can function without central bank assistance and governments that
can fund themselves in the bond markets in a benign inflation environment with
sustained economic growth, facilitating progressing out of their higher levels of
fiscal debt. To accomplish this, governments should pursue policies that will
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enhance their credibility and convince markets of their ability to reduce their fis-
cal deficits once their economies have recovered. With regard to central banks, it
is unlikely that they will resume their pre-crisis characteristics. Central banks will
have to re-establish and re-define their independence, approaches to monetary
policy, financial stability, regulation, governance, risk management and the pres-
ervation of balance sheet integrity. They would “need to strike a balance between
short-term stimulus and well articulated exit strategies that ensure long-term sus-
tainability. They need to allow the financial sector to shrink as borrowers reduce
their leverage. And they need to promote a shift in production patterns away from
export and leverage-led growth models towards more balanced ones.” (BIS
Annual Report, 2009).
In conclusion, it seems that the main challenges to central banks’ exit strategies is
not so much the mechanics thereof, but the timing and the related consequences
to the market and governments. Exiting too soon and suddenly may disrupt eco-
nomic recovery and affect long-term interest rates. Exiting too late may have
unintended consequences, as banks will enjoy the benefits of cheap liquidity
longer than necessary or justified. Exit strategies will also have to be coordinated
among countries in order to avoid further distortion of markets.
5.3.4. Safety net measures and moral hazard
Central banks’ unconventional interventions during the crisis that started in 2007
were unprecedented when compared to lender-of-last-resort (LOLR) facilities
that they have granted in the past. Central banks provided LOLR (or emergency
liquidity assistance) to a financial system rather than to individual institutions,
and in a concerted and cooperative manner. In addition, interventions taken
extended beyond the conventional concept of reducing bank funding liquidity
risk, to encompass market liquidity risk and its interaction with funding liquidity
against a background of heightened credit risk (Davis, 2008). It is not only banks
that have been bailed out, but also large non-bank financial institutions and even
non-financial corporates.
Any safety net intervention by central banks and governments, whether in the
form of emergency liquidity assistance, guarantees, credit or solvency support,
faces an inherent dilemma. On the one hand, safety net intervention helps to
sustain confidence in a financial system and financial stability. On the other hand,
it contributes to moral hazard. As Greenspan had already explained in 2001 in
an address on the topic of safety nets, the belief that large systemic banks or
financial institutions will not be allowed to fail makes both investors and depos-
itors less sensitive to a bank’s risk exposures and the effectiveness of its risk man-
agement processes. The safety net enables banks to accumulate larger, riskier
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asset portfolios than would be possible in an intermediation process driven solely
by market forces. With the safety net, lower interest rates and higher credit avail-
ability are accorded to riskier borrowers, benefiting speculative and riskier ven-
tures at the expense of sounder ones (Greenspan, 2001). By inducing greater risk
taking, the ultimate cost of providing safety net protection could increase signif-
icantly.
Moral hazard is even higher for large, complex or highly interconnected firms,
because the failure of such institutions poses a serious threat to financial stability.
As such, market discipline tends to be even lower for such systemically significant
firms, and excessive risk-taking is encouraged by safety net considerations. Iron-
ically, these large and complex institutions are often rewarded in terms of the
Basel II regulatory framework for their sophisticated risk measurement and mit-
igation systems, by having lower capital requirements. This contradiction may
require refinement of the regulation of systemically significant institutions that
are regarded as “too big or too complex to fail”. For example, such institutions
may have to be subjected to a more consistent and more conservative regulatory
regime. They may have to maintain higher capital requirements or penalties to
restrict growth, reflecting the greater risk that they pose to financial stability.
They may also require the development of special failure resolution mechanisms
(Bair, 2009; Bernanke, 2009; Geithner, 2009; Rajan, 2009).
Nevertheless, moral hazard must be dealt with during the good times and not in
the bad times, and the speed with which the global financial crisis evolved left
little time to ponder the moral hazard effects of central bank intervention. This
issue will have to receive attention alongside central banks’ exit strategies, and the
boundaries to safety net measures will have to be redefined.
5.3.5. A broader role for central banks
The extensive interventions by central banks during the crisis beyond their con-
ventional scope of influence (i.e. beyond the banking sector) have elicited much
debate and comment about their roles regarding financial stability relative to
price stability. Various central banks are in the process of restructuring their func-
tions and redefined their objectives as a result of the crisis, reflecting more explic-
itly their roles in protecting financial stability. In some cases, legal mandates have
also been strengthened. In various respects, however, this is unchartered territory
and central banks will have to re-define the relationship between their financial
stability and price stability mandates. However, there seems to be little doubt that
financial stability will become a much more integral central bank objective than
in the past. As was recently stated by the head of the monetary and economic
department of the BIS: “From now on, central bankers are going to think much
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more about systemic risk, about taking a macroprudential perspective and about
how it is that financial stability is the foundation of macroeconomic stability. […]
There are two lessons. First: you’ve got to take much more care to worry about
financial stability. The second is that worrying about financial stability means
much more than writing a financial stability report” (Cecchetti, 2009).
5.4. CONCLUSION
Central banks form the core of financial systems. They have a fairly common set
of goals, of which the key ones are to preserve monetary stability, promote finan-
cial stability, issue banknotes and coin, provide settlement services to banks, man-
age all or part of a country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves and provide
banking services (to varying degrees) to government.
The current financial crisis has vastly expanded the role that central banks played
in the major economies, both in terms of magnitude and in terms of their range
of activities. Central banks had to act fast and in innovative ways in order to
contain the damage of a significant loss of confidence in banks, other financial
institutions and financial market securities. As a result, the composition and size
of their balance sheets have changed significantly and, in some cases, they have
taken on additional financial and reputational risk.
The interventions of three central banks that have been most active in restoring
financial stability has been analysed in the paper, covering the period from August
2008 to June 2009. The analyses indicated that the interventions of these central
banks have a number of potential implications for future policy, relating to the
risk exposures of central banks themselves, monetary policy objectives and their
safety net activities. Exit strategies will have to be well planned and executed, in
respect of processes, coordination and timing.
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SUERF – SOCIÉTÉ UNIVERSITAIRE EUROPÉENNE DE 
RECHERCHES FINANCIÈRES
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who have
an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems, and the
conduct of monetary and regulatory policy. SUERF is a network association of
central bankers, bankers and other practitioners in the financial sector, and aca-
demics with the purpose of analysing and understanding European financial mar-
kets, institutions and systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy.
It organises regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes sev-
eral analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located at
the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate, per-
sonal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership cur-
rently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks. SUERF
is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership comprises
most of Europe's Central Banks (including the Bank for International Settle-
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DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK (DNB)
De Nederlandsche Bank, or DNB, champions financial stability and makes an
active contribution to prosperity in the Netherlands.
To this end, DNB:
• cooperates with other national central banks within the Eurosystem to
maintain price stability;
• aims for smooth, reliable and efficient settlement of payments;
• ensures that financial institutions have adequate financial buffers to meet
their liabilities as well as sound corporate governance;
• contributes to good national and international decision-making in these
areas by providing economic advice.
Authoritative knowledge and statistics are essential for the proper discharge of its
responsibilities. DNB strives to fully integrate and anchor sustainability in its
business operations and the performance of its tasks. As a knowledge institution,
DNB is committed to sharing its knowledge with society and strives to operate
effectively and efficiently.
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RABOBANK
Rabobank Group is an international financial services provider operating on the
basis of cooperative principles. It offers retail banking, wholesale banking, asset
management, leasing and real estate services. Focus is on all-finance services in
the Netherlands and on food & agri internationally. Rabobank Group is com-
prised of 152 independent local Rabobanks plus Rabobank Nederland, their cen-
tral organisation, and a number of subsidiaries. The group entities maintain
strong mutual ties. Overall, Rabobank Group has upwards of 60,000 employees
(in FTEs), who serve about 9.5 million clients in 46 countries.
During the current crisis Rabobank has been the only large bank in the Nether-
lands to operate without government support. It has managed to remain profita-
ble in both 2008 and 2009. In terms of Tier I capital Rabobank Group is among
the world’s 25 largest financial institutions, with a Tier 1 ratio of 13.8% (2009).
Rabobank Group has the highest credit rating (triple A), awarded by well-known
international rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investor
Service and Dominion Bond Rating Service. The origins of Rabobank lie in the
local loan cooperatives that were founded in the Netherlands nearly 110 years
ago by enterprising people who had virtually no access to the capital market.
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